Farm Animal Welfare and Quality Verification by Uzea, Adrian D. & Hobbs, Jill E.
 
CONSUMER AND MARKET DEMAND 













Farm Animal Welfare and Quality Verification 
 
 
Adrian Uzea and Jill E. Hobbs 
Department of Bioresource Policy, Business & Economics 
University of Saskatchewan  
 
 





Department of Rural Economy 
Faculty of Agriculture & Forestry,  
and Home Economics 



































Adrian Uzea and Jill E. Hobbs 
Department of Bioresource Policy, Business & Economics 









Acknowledgements: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Consumer and Market Demand 
Agriculture Policy Research Network. Farm Animal Welfare and Quality Verification 
 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that farm animal welfare may not be a top-of-mind issue 
for many consumers in North America. Nevertheless, there is pressure from animal welfare 
groups on food retailers and processors to implement more stringent requirements for their 
suppliers. Is the demand for more stringent animal welfare protocols primarily determined by a 
subset of consumers with very strong preferences or by an underlying change in consumer and 
societal preferences? Who do consumers trust for credible quality assurances with respect to 
farm animal welfare attributes? This paper provides a basis for further analysis of these issues. 
The roles of different stakeholders in delivering farm animal welfare quality assurances to 
consumers are first discussed. Then a social welfare analysis of the Canadian market for animal 
friendly pork is presented under different scenarios with respect to the strength of consumer 
preferences and the existence of voluntary standards versus mandatory standards. The analysis 
suggests that a situation of voluntary labelling that is reasonably credible is desirable as it 
maximizes the welfare that accrues to all players on the market. Furthermore, this scenario 
allows heterogeneous consumers to choose between different combinations of price and quality 
according to their preferences. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research. 
 
Keywords:  farm animal welfare, quality assurance, labelling, certification, heterogeneous 
consumers. 
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 Introduction  
As society becomes more affluent, food is increasingly differentiating by a growing array 
of quality attributes, from nutrition, to food safety, to convenience, to ethical and process 
attributes that relate to the way in which the food is produced. Animal welfare (AW), and farm 
animal welfare (FAW) in particular, is a process attribute that has been garnering increased 
attention in recent years. Increases in livestock productivity have been made possible through the 
use of animal confinement systems, scientific feed selection, and productivity-enhancing 
pharmaceuticals (Blandford, 2006). All of these improvements have facilitated a supply of 
affordable meat to consumers, but some contend this is a trade-off that has led to the 
deterioration of the conditions in which animals are raised (Norwood et al, 2007). The efforts of 
animal rights activists have created a new awareness of FAW that has encouraged changes in 
public policy and industry standards in some jurisdictions (Norwood et al, 2007, p.1).  
Most developed countries have regulations related to humane animal treatment, for 
example, in the 1970s the European Economic Community enacted regulations related to the 
slaughter and transportation of animals. Consumer research suggests that European Union (EU) 
consumers place considerable importance on farm animal welfare; for example, this emerged as 
one of the clearest findings of a 2007 Eurobarometer survey
1. In the United Stated (US), there 
are signs of increasing interest in FAW issues. In 2000, a number of US animal rights 
organizations (AROs) demanded that individual restaurant chains, e.g. McDonald’s, require their 
suppliers to follow specific animal welfare guidelines developed by activist organizations. In an 
effort to respond in a manner that would demonstrate to their restaurant customers their concern 
                                                 
1 EC 2007 - Special Eurobarometer 270–  The average respondent rated the importance of the FAW issue at almost 
8 out of 10 on a maximum scale of 10. 
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 for FAW, several restaurant chains began to develop their own animal welfare guidelines and 
programs (Brown and Hollingsworth, 2005). 
More recently, in January 2007 several large players in the meat industry, e.g. Smithfield 
Foods Inc. and Maple Leaf Foods Inc. announced that they will require their suppliers to phase 
out the confinement of sows in gestation crates over the next decade (HSUS, 2007). Following 
the same pattern, in February 2008 in a letter sent to The Humane Society of the United States 
(HSUS), the California-based retailer Safeway indicated that buying decisions would give 
preference to poultry manufacturers in North America that use or switch to an AW friendly 
controlled slaughter systems (HSUS, 2008)
2.  
These events may signal the beginnings of an interaction between animal rights 
organizations and food retailers, but are these issues paramount in the minds of North American 
food consumers? Norwood et al (2007) elicited the opinion of US consumers with respect to 
FAW, finding that it was ranked relatively low compared to other social issues, i.e. human 
poverty, the US health system, and food safety. In 2006 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
(AAFC) commissioned Ipsos-Reid to conduct market research regarding Canadian consumer 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviours with respect to food safety and food quality (AAFC, 2006). 
FAW was addressed indirectly. The survey suggested that FAW was not a major issue for most 
consumers; it was rated as important by less than 3% of respondents. When it came to the 
importance of different food attributes in the decision-making process, “knowing that animals 
were treated humanely”, was only the eighth most important. Opinions of Canadian consumers 
                                                 
2 In its letter to HSUS, Safeway indicated that currently it is buying pork from vendors who are phasing out the 
crates and will increase that business by purchasing an additional 5% in the first year, 10% in the year two and 10% 
in year three. In addition, Safeway indicated that it would implement a new policy that gives preferred supplier 
status to firms providing cage free eggs. This buying preference is intended to favour producers who are converting 
away from battery-cage confinement systems. Nearly 3% of the eggs that Safeway sells are from cage-free egg 
producers. Over the next two years, the company indicated that it plans to more than double that amount to 6% of 
Safeway’s overall egg volume HSUS (2008). 
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 have also been evaluated through Ipsos-Reid polls conducted in 1999, 2002 and 2004, where 
animal care ranked among the top concerns specifically for Canadian hog production, along with 
food safety and environment (Lawrence, 2007). For example, the 2004 survey showed that 
among the issues related to hog production, AW was ranked fourth, after production issues and 
environmental concerns (Jones, 2006)
3  
The limited evidence available to date suggests that animal welfare may not currently be 
a top-of-mind issue for many consumers in North America, and yet we are seeing pressure from 
animal welfare groups for food retailers and processors to adopt more stringent requirements of 
their suppliers. Clearly consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences, values and attitudes, 
and, therefore in their expectations for food products. These beliefs modify with increasing 
incomes (Blandford, 2006). How might these preferences change over time? Is the demand for 
more stringent animal welfare protocols driven primarily by a subset of consumers with very 
strong preferences, or does it signal an underlying change in consumer and societal preferences? 
Who do consumers trust for credible quality assurances with respect to FAW? This paper begins 
by defining the concept of animal welfare and summarizes legislative approaches to animal 
welfare in the EU, Australia, US and Canada. The paper then discusses the roles of different 
stakeholders in delivering FAW quality assurances to consumers in the Canadian context. Using 
the pork sector as a case study, the paper concludes with a social welfare analysis of the market 
for animal welfare friendly pork products under different scenarios with respect to the strength of 
consumer preferences for FAW products, the existence of voluntary standards versus mandatory 
standards, and the credibility of third party certification. Suggestions are provided for further 
                                                 
3 Jones (2006) - Q3. “When thinking about hog farming, what thoughts or topics come to mind?” Answers were 
counted as total mentions over a sample of 1601 consumers. 
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 research, particularly with respect to assessing consumer attitudes and preferences on the basis of 
the analysis presented in this paper.   
Defining Farm Animal Welfare 
Recently in the media and through other information sources there has been a host of 
different representations of specific farm production practices in their relation to animal welfare. 
For instance, stalls (i.e. for gestation or farrowing) are a popular choice in pig farming as they 
allow closer monitoring of sows’ health, enable the sows to be fed/watered while facing no 
competition from the other sows, and protect newborn piglets from being crushed when a sow 
lies down unexpectedly (Saskatchewan Pork Development Board, n.d; BC SPCA, 2008). It is 
also argued that stalls may not provide enough room for sows to move and may deprive them of 
the ability to express important natural behaviours, such as roaming, rooting, and interacting with 
other animals (BC SPCA, 2008).
 As this example shows, a specific production technology may 
have conflicting impacts on AW, and the interpretation of what is ‘good’ for an animal’s well-
being is not always straightforward. 
Currently, there is no universally accepted definition of animal welfare. Some scientists 
take the approach that AW relates only to the physical wellbeing of the animal, while another 
approach holds that AW should be expanded to include what the animals feel. A general 
definition of AW relates to how well the animal is coping with a situation it is in. If an animal 
does not appear to be coping then its welfare is considered to be at risk (DPIA, 2004). At the 
same time, there is a widespread acceptance of the definition of the “Five Freedoms”, as 
elucidated by the United Kingdom Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC). The Five Freedoms 
consist of: freedom from hunger and thirst (ready access to fresh water and diet), freedom from 
discomfort (provision of an appropriate environment), freedom from pain, injury or disease – 
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 prevention, freedom to express normal behaviour, and freedom from fear and distress (FAWC, 
1988). Other authors, such as Fraser and Weary (2004), have identified three main aspects of 
welfare: biological functioning, affective states (pain), and natural living.
4 
While the above approaches for defining FAW suggest an ideal environment in which 
animals can be raised, they are often not consistent with many conventional farming practices. 
For instance, production systems, such as confinement in cages or battery stalls, restrict the 
ability of animals to express their natural behaviour. Certain production practices, such as 
restriction of feed for laying hens to induce moulting, beak trimming and toe clipping to decrease 
injuries to confined poultry, castration methods and early tail docking for cattle and pigs, are also 
seen to be inconsistent with these definitions of FAW. The transportation of animals to slaughter 
plants can affect the welfare of animals depending on the length of time animals are transported, 
the duration of rest periods, the loading densities, and their handling at loading and unloading. 
Finally, the method of slaughter, particularly the use of different methods for stunning animals 
and their handling in slaughter plants, is an element of humane treatment.  
McInerney (2004) argues that although there is no formal way to measure or even rank 
FAW states, we do form images about what constitutes better, good or bad conditions. In this 
sense, he argues that, despite the animal scientists’ definitions, FAW is in reality a subset of 
human welfare: the animals’ preferences and well being having relevance only to the extent they 
are important to us. These challenges in defining FAW notwithstanding, society’s growing 
interest in FAW has spurred an increase in legislative activity, codes of practice implemented by 
                                                 
4  Biological functioning refers to the health and performance of animals under different production systems; 
affective states means pain, fear and distress displayed by animals under different systems; and natural living is the 




 producer organizations, and in some cases buyer restrictions on production practices (Blandford, 
2006). 
Legislation Related to Farm Animal Welfare 
Legislation related to animal welfare can now be found in many countries, and 
international initiatives also exist (Arey and Broke, 2006). Countries can prohibit certain human 
behaviours towards animals by proscribing it in the criminal law or they can adopt legislation 
that specifies a minimum level of welfare. In parallel, governments have employed rounds of 
consultations with the public and with the food processing industry in the development of laws 
intended to assure sustainable livestock production and AW (Whiting, 2005a). All of these 
legislative initiatives related to FAW vary from one region of the world to another. This section 
provides a review of legislation across the EU, Australia, the US, and Canada. 
Legislation in the European Union 
Many of the animal welfare issues in livestock production have been raised within the 
EU, which has been the main driver of legislative actions worldwide. The Council of Europe and 
European Commission (EC) play an important role in the formation of the EU’s AW policy. 
Although the driving force related to animal welfare was public opinion, the EU legislation is 
based upon input from the scientific community, usually on reports from the EU Scientific 
Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (Moynagh, 2000)
5.  
                                                 
5 This is a scientific advisory committee of the EU composed of 19 scientists active in the field of animal health and 
animal welfare. The function of the Committee is to advise the Commission, which is the body charged with 
proposing new legislation (Moynagh, 2000).  
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 The first EU legislation on FAW was enacted in 1974 and was related to the slaughter 
and transportation of animals
6. The EU’s original slaughter legislation was replaced in 1993 to 
restrict the slaughter of animals outside slaughterhouses and to regulate the humane slaughter of 
farm animals. A 2005 regulation, related to transportation, includes mandatory requirements for 
shorter transportation times for different species, i.e. 24 hours for pigs, as well as improved 
conditions for the animals during transport, i.e. permanent ventilation and access to water. 
In order to have a uniform FAW policy across all of its member states, the EU included a 
protocol on the welfare and protection of animals in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty 
asked the Community and Member States to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of 
animals when formulating and implementing policies related to agriculture and transport. More 
recently, in January 2006 the EC adopted the Community Action Plan for the protection and 
welfare of animals for the period 2006-2010.  
Other EU regulations address the issue of confinement, affecting the welfare of calves, 
pigs, and laying hens. For instance, several minimum standards have been approved since 1988 – 
the Laying Hens Directive (88/166/EEC of 7 March 1988) and 1991 – Pig Protection Directive 
(91/630/EEC of 19 November 1991). Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 prohibited the 
use of individual pens for calves over eight weeks old, banned the use of tethers except in 
specific circumstances and included requirements for feed.
7  Producers are required to comply 
with these AW production standards. The EU subsequently pushed the FAW barrier even further 
with a 1999 ban on conventional cages for laying hens to be phased-in over a number of years; 
                                                 
6 The main EU legislative actions were: 1974/1993 Stunning and Killing, 1977/1995 Transport protection Transport 
time limit and densities, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of 
animals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 
 
7 Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes. 
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 the existing systems are being modified to comply with the more stringent standard.
8 In addition, 
the 1991 directive for minimum standards for the protection of pigs has been amended twice by 
directives 2001/88/EC and 2001/93/EC
9. For dry sows, the new standard effectively bans the use 
of tethers for sows and gilts from 2006 and the use of sow stalls (except for the first four weeks 
of pregnancy) from 2013. Sows must be kept in groups from 4 weeks after serving until a week 
before the expected time of farrowing (Arey and Broke, 2006). 
All the regulations outlined above have to be applied uniformly by the EU members. The 
EC's Food and Veterinary Office carries out audits in the member states to check the status of 
implementation (Horgan and Gavinelli, 2006). However, there are notable differences between 
the EU countries in this respect. For instance, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom have 
adopted more stringent national FAW standards, i.e. for space allowances in some species, 
compared to the minimum EU standards. 
Legislation in Australia 
Australia’s animal welfare strategy is based on an agreement among various stakeholders. 
The guidelines related to AW were developed by the National Consultative Committee on 
Animal Welfare (NCCAW)
10. These guidelines are developed based on scientific knowledge and 
                                                 
8 Moynagh (2000) states “Legislation in force sets a minimum space for caged hens of 450 square centimeters or 70 
square inches per hen. This minimum requirement increases to 500 square centimeters for existing cages. By 2003 
the minimum space allowance increased to 550 square centimeters for such cages. By 2012 all existing cages must 
meet this 750 square centimeter cage requirement. Also, each cage must be enriched. An enriched cage will have 
facilities in the cage to allow the birds to express normal bird behavior. For example, the birds will have the ability 
to stretch their wings” (p.111).   
 
9 Arey and Broke (2006, p. 67) - “These two new directives lay down the new minimum standards for the housing 
and management of pigs. Minimum general housing refer to all of the following: stocking densities, pen sizes, pigs’ 
ability to see other pigs, keeping sows in groups, comfort and rest, construction, maintenance, cleaning, heating, 
ventilation, flooring, lighting, noise. Minimum general management standards refer to all of the following: 
inspection, treatment of sick or injured pigs, mutilations such as castration and tail docking, feeding and drinking, 
access to foraging material such as straw and mushroom compost, training of stockpersons”. 
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 expertise, and are suggested practices for the acceptable use and treatment of animals (MAFF, 
2007).  
The MAFF developed Model Codes of Practice for FAW in cooperation with the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and with feedback 
from the other stakeholders. For instance, the recent code on the welfare of pigs is intended as a 
guide for all people responsible for the welfare of pigs under both intensive, deep litter and 
outdoor systems (MAFF, 2007). 
Other sectors like the egg industry have developed similar voluntary codes of practice, 
i.e. the Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals – Domestic Poultry 4th Edition 
adopted in 2001. Based on this code, the Australian Egg Corporation (AECL) is the organization 
mandated to help egg producers to determine if their layer cages comply with these new 
standards and to determine the number of hens that can be housed in their cages (AECL 2008)
11. 
The 2001 standard specifies increasing the space allowance for hens in cages (i.e. from 450 cm
2 
to 550 cm
2) as well as an economic life for cages of 20 years from the date the cages were 
commissioned
12. These decisions have been endorsed by each State and Territory Government 
and are the basis for achieving improved hen welfare outcomes in Australia (AECL, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 MAFF (2007) - NCCAW functions are to: assess and advise the Federal Government on the national implications 
of welfare issues affecting animals, advise on the effectiveness and appropriateness of national codes of practice, 
policies, guidelines and legislation to safeguard or further the welfare of animals and protect the national interest, 
liaise with other relevant bodies such as the Animal Welfare Working Group (which is a working group of the 
Animal Health Committee), and other functions that were required or conferred on the committee by the Minister.  
 
11 AECL (2008) - The AECL is a producer owned company which integrates marketing, research and development 
and policy services for the benefit of all stakeholders. AECL is mainly funded through statutory levies collected 
under the Egg Industry Service Provision Act 2002 and Australian government funds for the purposes of research & 
development. 
 
12 AECL (2008) - Cages commissioned prior to 1 January 2001 have until 1 January 2008 to meet the 1995 
standards and may be stocked with a minimum space allowance per bird of 450 cm
2 (3 or more fowls (< 2.4kg) per 
cage) for 20 years from the date they were commissioned or until 1 January 2008, whichever is the later. Cages 




 Legislation in the United States  
All US states have an anti-cruelty statute, but the legislation does not deal with farm 
animals specifically. The Humane Slaughter Act is the Federal law regulating the transport and 
the slaughter of livestock. It focuses on processors, banning specific equipment used in livestock 
slaughtering.  
For the last few years there has been an increase in the legislative activity related to AW. 
Animal rights organizations (AROs) had various ballot initiatives on banning certain livestock 
practices at the state level. For instance, under the pressure of the HSUS, Florida voters approved 
a measure in 2002 that amended the state constitution by prohibiting gestation stalls in hog 
production. In a similar manner Arizona voters approved a measure in 2006 prohibiting gestation 
stalls and veal stalls (Siemens, 2007). Further, there has been an average of 50 to 60 Federal and 
state level bills related to AW introduced annually in recent years (Rollin, 2004). It is worth 
noting that the Farm Animal Stewardship Purchasing Act (H.R. 5557), a pending bill introduced 
in 2006 in the US congress, requires that those supplying food to the Federal government for the 
military, federal prisons, school lunches, and other programs meet a basic set of modest welfare 
standards for farm animals (HSUS, 2006). 
Legislation in Canada 
The Canadian Federal Government protects AW through several federal laws. First, AW 
has been included in The Criminal Code of Canada, which prohibits anyone from wilfully 
causing animals to suffer from neglect, pain or injury. The S-203 bill, a recent enactment of the 
House of Commons, amends the Criminal Code to increase the maximum penalties for an animal 
10 
 cruelty offence (Parliament of Canada, 2008a)
13. Second, The Health of Animals Regulations 
Part XII defines conditions for the humane transportation of all animals in Canada by all modes 
of transport (CFIA, 2008a)
14. The regulations are enforced by the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency (CFIA), with assistance from the Canadian Border Services Agency, provincial police 
forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Third, sections 61 to 80 of the Meat Inspection 
Regulations set standards for the humane handling and slaughter of food animals in federally 
inspected slaughter facilities. CFIA’s inspectors, stationed at every federally registered slaughter 
establishment, monitor the handling and slaughter of food animals (CFIA, 2008a). Each province 
has its own legislation dealing with AW, which typically recognizes accepted humane practices. 
In the majority of the provinces there is an exemption for generally accepted practices of animal 
management (Blandford, 2006). 
Currently, Canada does not have a farm animal welfare policy similar to that of Australia 
or the EU. FAW was not included in the first two rounds of the “Agricultural Policy Framework” 
developed by AAFC in conjunction with the Provincial and Territorial governments. Almost 
three decades ago, in 1980, the Federal government (AAFC) created the Animal Welfare 
                                                 
13 Parliament of Canada (2008, b) – The bill was passed by the Senate on November 27, 2007, was adopted in the 
House of Commons on April, 9
 2008, and came into force in May, 2008. Sections 444 to 447 of the Criminal Code 
were replaced. For instance section 444 of the Criminal Code is replaced by the following: “444. (1) Every one 
commits an offence who wilfully: (a) kills, maims, wounds, poisons or injures cattle; or (b) places poison in such a 
position that it may easily be consumed by cattle. Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty 
of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or (b) an offence 
punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than eighteen months or to both” Parliament of Canada (2008a, p.1). 
 
14 CFIA (2008a) - These regulations prohibit overcrowding, transportation of incompatible animals in the same stall, 
transportation of animals unfit to travel. Also they specify appropriate conditions for loading and unloading of 
animals, adequate feeding and watering regimes, maximum transit times, minimum rest periods, bedding 
requirements, and states that animals that become compromised while in transit must not be transported beyond the 
closest area where they can receive proper medical care. 
11 
 Coordinating Committee to develop recommended codes of practice for all major farm species
15. 
At the national level the codes represent voluntary guidelines and include various minimum 
standards for producers and others. Since 2005, the codes have been one of the responsibilities of 
the National Farm Animal Care Council (NFACC) (CFIA, 2008a) whose role will be discussed 
in detail in section 4.1, where a summary will also be provided of other non-legislative 
approaches to FAW in Canada.   
Quality Verification and the Role of Different Stakeholders 
From the consumer’s perspective farm animal welfare practices are credence attributes: 
the consumer cannot determine through inspection at the point of purchase or experience after 
consumption, whether the producers used production methods designed to enhance animal 
welfare
16. Since consumers cannot assess whether the livestock product incorporates the FAW 
attributes advertised by the producer, the producers have an opportunity to supply false 
information to consumers. This is a classic case of information asymmetry. Given that 
consumers are not able to assess the accuracy of the information provided by sellers, they may 
not trust these assurances. In other words, buyers will not react to accurate claims (MacDonald, 
2005) and the market will under-provide FAW. 
Mechanisms to address market deficiencies for FAW products include legislation, codes 
of practice and labelling. Legislation is an instrument that the government uses in setting 
                                                 
15 These codes were developed as a result of co-operation between researchers, federal and provincial 
representatives, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s), such as the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies 
and the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association. 
 
16 Stigler (1961) named the first category of features as search attributes. Later on, Nelson (1970) gave a more 
accurate definition of search attributes by considering them “as those that consumer can know by inspecting the 
product prior to the purchase”. Additionally he expanded his assessment to permit experience characteristics that can 
be evaluated after purchase and consumption. Darby and Karni (1973) introduced the third category of attributes, 
namely credence attributes that cannot be evaluated by the buyer even after consumption. Thus the product’s quality 
is dependent on a mix of search, experience, and credence characteristics (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). 
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 minimum mandatory AW standards. Legislation promulgated by the government aims to reflect 
government’s assessment of the demands for minimum standards of FAW coming from society 
(DPIA, 2004).   
Codes of practice act as a starting point for the procedures of livestock industries and 
provide information for the other interested stakeholders, i.e. Animal Rights Organizations 
(AROs), animal industry participants and the general public. Sometimes, private enterprises - i.e. 
farm industry organizations, processors, retailers – have their own FAW industry codes of 
practice, which are generally more stringent than the minimum required by the legislation 
(DPIA, 2004). While it is important to be able to define industry practices that improve AW – 
i.e. standard setting – the certification and verification of these practices through an assessment 
and audit process cannot be neglected. It therefore becomes important to monitor livestock 
products along the product chain – i.e. starting with production at the farm level, continuing 
through transport to and slaughter at the abattoir – to ensure that all supply chain members 
comply with the existing set of FAW codes of practice. This provides a credible assurance to 
consumers that the “friendly” products marketed do indeed carry the desired FAW attributes.  
Labels are an additional mechanism that producers and governments use to help 
consumers make informed choices. Labels are an important tool for producers to achieve price 
premiums if there are a significant number of consumers who are willing to pay for FAW 
products (DPIA, 2004). Frewer et al (2005) consider that consumers may make product choices 
based on knowledge about the production system itself, effective traceability of AW products 
through the food chain, and trust in product labels. Credible labelling also requires the effective 
implementation of a farm monitoring system for FAW-oriented products, independent of 
whether this is imposed voluntarily or through statutory requirement.  
13 
 Irrespective of the stakeholder responsible for setting and auditing the FAW standards 
and labels, the assurances that they provide to consumers have to be assessed through criteria 
that evaluate the meaningfulness of FAW claims. For example, Dotson (2007) suggests that 
credibility hinges on whether the standards are a measurable, verifiable and defendable program 
that will be widely accepted and trusted by the consumer. Farm Sanctuary (n.d) suggests that 
third party certification programs could be assessed on the basis of whether they are transparent, 
based on public input, objective and measurable, independently verified, reliable and consistent, 
and relevant (Farm Sanctuary, n.d.)
17. As well, these criteria may be used to a more limited 
degree to evaluate producer labelling product claims and industry quality assurance programs 
(Farm Sanctuary, n.d, p.15)  
Other authors –i.e., Frewer et al 2005 – consider that consumers’ confidence in these 
stakeholders is multidimensional, and that various psychological constructs determine trust or 
distrust. They hypothesized that the trust dimensions are the extent to which an institution or a 
food chain actor is perceived to be “accountable to others for maintaining high standards of 
AW”, has the “expertise to maintain high standards of AW”, is likely to “distort information 
about its activities to promote a vested interest”, and is trustworthy regarding AW issues.  
                                                 
17 A standard is transparent when complete guidelines, as well as information on how standards were developed, 
reviewed and verified are available to the public. Public input consists of multiple stakeholders – i.e., consumers’ 
organisations and AROs – that have the opportunity to comment on development and revision and program 
standards. Industry representatives may also play an advisory role as long as they do not have financial ties to the 
certifying organization. Standards are objective when they are written in a form that allows for objective verification 
of compliance and are measurable – i.e., when quantitative indicators for assessment are available. For instance, 
what constitutes compliance with a standard should be clearly stated for the benefit of both the producer and the 
auditor.  Independently verified means a certifying organization and individual auditors who are financially 
independent of the facility being audited and have no professional or business ties to the industry must perform the 
verification process. The identity and qualifications of the auditors, as well as the description of the auditing process, 
should also be available. Reliable and consistent means that certifying organizations should implement quality 
control measures to ensure the quality of the auditing process. This may be accomplished by periodically shadowing 
the auditors and interviewing clients regarding the audit process. Relevant means that standards must be meaningful 
measures of the well-being of farm animals. Moreover, they should be comprehensive, covering all aspects of 
animal care and handling from breeding to slaughter (Farm Sanctuary, n.d, p.16).   
 
14 
 The following subsections analyze the role of different stakeholders, i.e. government, 
farmer industry groups, retailers and processors, third party organizations, and animal rights 
groups, involved in providing consumers with appropriate FAW in the market place. Where 
applicable, we provide examples highlighting Canadian and US stakeholders’ activities in this 
respect. 
 
The Role of Government 
Society consists of heterogeneous individuals with various preferences and different 
levels of awareness about animal welfare. Government has the role of taking into account the 
preferences of all stakeholders and using them in the development of appropriate policies. The 
main goal of the government is expected to be the maximization of the well-being of the whole 
community (DPIA, 2004).  
The intervention of the government is usually motivated by different market failures, 
including externalities and information problems (information asymmetry and incomplete 
information). An externality occurs when the action of a firm imposes uncompensated costs or 
benefits on an outside party (MacDonald, 2005). Appropriate conditions for raising farm animals 
provide private economic benefits to producers and some level of positive external benefits to 
people who care about AW status (McVittie et al, 2006). Some people can suffer a loss of utility 
by knowing the conditions in which animals are raised at the farm – i.e. members of AROs – or 
by knowing that other consumers eat meat – i.e. some vegans. The farm activities necessary to 
generate optimal private returns may typically not deliver the level of public good externality 
that is demanded by some members of society (McVittie et al, 2006). To the extent that these 
15 
 views are representative for society, and if the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs, there 
is a rationale for the government to intervene in the market in order to address the market failure.  
By simply tasting the meat, a consumer cannot determine whether the pork chops are 
from a pig grown on straw bedding in a free-range environment or from a pig housed in a barn 
on slatted floors. If consumers knew all relevant information about the FAW conditions 
associated with the production of free-range pork they could make fully informed choices and 
transmit these preferences to producers through price signals (MacDonald, 2005). In order to 
deal with these types of informational failures, MacDonald (2005) considers that the government 
has three policy alternatives.  
The first alternative is mandatory FAW regulation which would require producers to 
comply with minimum standards. In order to assure producer compliance with these standards, 
the government’s agencies – i.e., CFIA –, would have to ensure enforcement. The pitfall of 
government intervention through mandatory standards is that the costs associated with livestock 
production, as well as the costs associated with standard setting and enforcement, would be 
higher. In particular, these costs have to be incurred by all buyers irrespective of their preference 
for FAW products (this case is analyzed in Section 6.0).  
The second alternative is that of mandatory labelling of AW practices, which in theory 
would provide information about AW by requiring labelling of all livestock products sold to all 
consumers. The “public good” nature of advertising would allow humane providers to benefit 
from the ‘advertising’ provided by the mandatory label attached to non-humane sellers 
(MacDonald, 2005). Again, an assessment of the relative costs and benefits of this approach 
would be necessary. 
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    The third policy alternative is government involvement in the provision of certification 
and accreditation services to producers. Government agencies would likely have to ensure 
compliance through enforcement (Dotson, 2007). Government standard-setting and certification 
is not without risks, even if consumers view the information as credible. If product designs and 
relevant attributes are changing rapidly standards may need to be redesigned over time and 
alternative certifications may be desirable. MacDonald (2005) argues that government-set 
standards tend to be inflexible, and suggests that government standard-setting may not respond 
quickly to changing industry conditions. 
In addition to these three alternatives, the government could intervene in addressing 
potential misinformation on AW issues. In developing preferences with respect to AW, the 
broader community relies on receiving truthful information. In some instances, more radical 
AROs may use emotional and graphic arguments in their campaigns. In the absence of other 
objective opinions, i.e. from independent AW scientists, the public could assume that 
conventional farming is totally detrimental to AW. If society perceives a standard of FAW to be 
too low, then it will demand what it perceives as a higher level regardless of the actual level of 
AW or suffering (DPIA, 2004)
18. In this situation the livestock industry would have a strong 
incentive to respond with an alternative information campaign, although consumers may be left 
wondering who to believe.   
Of course, government awareness of the preferences of society regarding AW may be 
imperfect. It is difficult for government to measure the level of AW that the public considers 
appropriate, since it usually does not have any benchmark i.e. market for friendly products with 
                                                 
18 For instance, members of society may demand that a certain practice, i.e. gestation stalls or battery cages be 




 varying levels of AW. Thus, governments may invest in strategies to identify society’s 
preferences, through consumer research, public consultations, etc. for the purposes of informed 
policymaking (DPIA, 2004).  
The last type of information deficiency, incomplete information, occurs when the 
relevant information is not known by any of the stakeholders involved in an AW issue. For 
instance, one cannot identify a widely accepted definition of AW. Additionally, the stakeholders 
disagree as to how best to measure animal welfare
19. This lack of agreement makes it difficult to 
measure AW and to formulate a widely agreed and scientifically sound definition of animal 
welfare. Good policy on AW relies on the quality of existing knowledge (DPIA, 2004). 
Canadian Government Approaches to FAW 
Rather than instituting minimum mandatory standards related to farm animal welfare, the 
Federal government in Canada has several different initiatives that relate, directly or indirectly, 
to FAW. The development of Canadian food labelling requirements and guidelines for method of 
production claims is ongoing. The responsibility for food labelling regulation is shared between 
Health Canada and the CFIA
20. In particular, the CFIA Food Labelling Information Service 
consolidates and coordinates voluntary federal food label reviews. The CFIA has attempted to 
find an effective way to apply proposed guidelines for the use of methods of production claims – 
i.e., AW claims such as “free range”, “freedom raised”, “free run”, antibiotic and hormone free 
                                                 
19 While some groups use definitions based on physical measures of wellbeing such as fertility rates, output and 
growth, others believe the definition should incorporate the emotional wellbeing of the animal and take into account 
such factors as stress, fear and discomfort.  
 
20 CFIA (2008) - Health Canada is responsible, under the Food and Drugs Act (FDA), for the establishment of 
policies and standards relating to the health, safety, and nutritional quality of food sold in Canada. The CFIA is 
responsible for the administration of food labelling policies related to misrepresentation and fraud with respect to 
food labelling, packaging and advertising, and the general agri-food and fish labelling provisions respecting grade, 




 claims – in the labelling and advertising of meat, poultry and fish products. Accordingly, the 
CFIA launched rounds of public consultations, such as the 2005 consultation round on 
“Clarifying the Labelling Guidelines for Method of Production Claims on Meat, Poultry and Fish 
Products”. These drew upon stakeholders’ knowledge, concerns and opinions to identify key 
issues. To date, it appears that the consultations have not produced a consensus of opinion on an 
appropriate way forward with respect to the application of Method of Production claims to AW. 
In a second approach, the Federal government became involved in the establishment of 
the National Farm Animal Care Council (NFACC). This organization was founded in 2005 with 
broad participation of stakeholders from the animal product industry. The main goal of NFACC 
is to provide a forum for coordination and collaboration among stakeholders regarding FAW 
issues, and to assume responsibility for ensuring the ongoing development of codes of practice. 
AAFC and CFIA are represented on NFACC, as are a number of producer associations, 
consumer organizations, and animal welfare organizations
21. In addition to the development of 
recommended codes of practice, the NFACC has also defined an “Animal Care Assessment 
Model” (ACA) which is intended to provide guidance on AW, outline high level principles and 
is proposed as a credible approach to the establishment of verification programs (NFACC, 2008). 
Currently, the ACA model is not publicly available and therefore an assessment of its likely 
efficacy is not possible at the present time.  
If the Federal government’s approaches to FAW are assessed through the ‘credibility 
rules’ outlined previously, it could be said that they are reasonably transparent since the 
complete guidelines, as well as information on how voluntary standards were developed, 
                                                 
 
21 Other members are: producer groups associations (i.e., the Canadian Pork Council, the Canadian Poultry and Egg 
Processors Council), processors’ associations (i.e., the Canadian Meat Council), retailers’ and food service 
associations (i.e., Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors), and animal rights organizations (i.e., Canadian 
Federation of Humane Societies) (NFACC, 2008). 
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 reviewed and verified are available to the public (with the exception of details on the ACA 
model). As well, the NFACC’s activity is based on public input, since multiple stakeholders had 
the opportunity to comment on development and revision and program standards. The relevance 
of these activities is underscored by the fact that standards were comprehensive, covering all 
aspects of animal care and handling from breeding to slaughter. While it was important to define 
industry practices that improve FAW, the certification and verification of these practices along 
the supply chain through an assessment and audit process may be key to maintaining consumer 
confidence. The appropriate role for government in Canada in certification and verification 
activities for animal welfare remains undefined. 
In summary, governments have a role to represent the public interest and to contribute to 
the nation’s economic welfare. The strength of the government is grounded in its ability to 
institute legislation and its power to publicly condemn certain outcomes. However, the danger 
that the government faces is making policy on the basis of non-representative opinions. Further, 
policymakers face the danger of instituting ineffective legislation and wasteful bureaucracy, i.e. 
in the case of mandatory certification when it is not required. Despite these limitations, as 
Meredith (2000) argues, governments have the opportunity to foster public understanding of all 
stakeholders’ point of view, and encourage dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders with 
the objective of achieving a socially optimal level of FAW. 
 
The Role of Farmers and Farmers’ Industry Associations 
Producers have more information on the production of livestock products than consumers 
and society in general. They also have a different interest in the adoption of production standards 
and farm animal welfare standards in particular. The factors that affect their individual decision-
20 
 making include trade-offs between AW and profitability, level of concern for animal welfare 
regardless of profitability, level of understanding about welfare issues, management skills, 
incentives that may exist for higher AW standards (e.g. market advantage) and deterrents for 
poor AW (e.g. litigation) (DPIA, 2004).  
Rising social pressure by consumers groups and AROs is forcing the livestock industry to 
re-examine its production practices. The campaigns of the AROs, such as HSUS or People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), aim to eliminate certain production systems, e.g. 
battery cages, gestation stalls. A number of constraints might preclude farmers from changing 
their production practices, including financial considerations, lack of understanding of the ethical 
preferences of consumers, insensitivity to welfare needs of livestock, and rejection of the welfare 
concerns of animal rights organizations, in other words, alternative views of what constitutes 
‘humane’ treatment of animals (Meredith, 2000). 
Potentially, externalities also provide incentives for the industry to develop industry 
codes of practice related to FAW: codes that aim to ensure good behaviour by all participants. 
An externality occurs when the actions of an individual producer influence society’s perception 
of the industry as a whole, thus affecting the profitability of other producers (DPIA, 2004). 
According to Dotson (2007), livestock producers have four alternatives for addressing these 
issues. First, they can do nothing and just let activists define the FAW agenda for them. 
Producers who choose this route over time may be unable to find a market for their product. 
Second, producers can self-certify using self-endorsed programs and policies. This is the choice 
that many producers and livestock associations have made. For example, Burnbrae Farms Ltd, a 
Canadian egg producer, uses its own certification for products such as eggs carrying FAW 
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 attributes (i.e., free run)
22 
23. A number of examples of livestock and poultry associations that 
self-certify using endorsed programs also exist. In 2003 the US National Pork Board introduced 
a voluntary initiative called the Swine Welfare Assurance Program (SWAP). Similarly, the 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency and the Canadian Pork Council launched the Animal Care 
Assessment (ACA) and Animal Care Program (ACP) in 2002 and 2005, respectively. These 
programs set out the requirements for animal care for participating producers. More information 
on these examples of codes of practice and certification in the US and Canada can be found in 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3.   
The common feature of the Canadian industry programs is that they are based on the 
recommended codes of practice released by AAFC in the 1980s and subsequently revised and 
updated by the two farmer industry organizations
24 
25. In addition, the two producer 
organizations sought input from other stakeholders involved in the development of these codes. 
The major difference between the two programs is that currently the CPC is focusing on 
promoting the implementation of the ACA program. In addition, the CPC program is a voluntary 
                                                 
22 According to the firm, “Burnbrae Farms Limited is a family owned and operated company that has been 
producing eggs for over 50 years. With farms in Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba, Burnbrae Farms is one of Canada’s 
leading egg producers and a thriving participant in its agribusiness industry. The company sells eggs and egg 
products to major grocery store chains, food service operations and large/bakery industrial customers throughout 
Canada” (Burnbrae Farms Limited website, 2008a). 
  
23  Burnbrae states that “Naturegg Free Run eggs are produced by hens that are free to roam in wide open concept 
barns equipped with nests and perches. Our hens are fed a multi-grain feed that is manufactured to our specifications 
and contains no medications or antibiotics. The eggs are laid in a clean nest, ensuring the cleanest possible product. 
A monitoring system is in place to ensure that only eggs produced by our free-run flocks are packed in free run 
cartons. Naturegg Free Run eggs are packed in 100% post-consumer recycled cartons that are recyclable where 
facilities exist” (Burnbrae Farms Limited website, 2008b). 
 
24 The old code for the raising of laying hens, released by AAFC in 1989, was the “Recommended code of practice 
for the care and handling of poultry from hatchery to processing plant”. Its updated version released in 2003 under 
the auspices of Canadian Agri-Food Research Council and the initiative of the CEMA is called “Recommended 
Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of Pullets, Layers and Spent Fowl” (CEMA, 2002 Annual Report). 
 
25 The old code for raising pigs, released by AAFC in 1984, was the “Recommended code of practice for care and 
handling of pigs”. Its revised and updated version, at the initiative of the CPC in 1993, is called “Recommended 
Code of Practice for the care and handling of farm animals: Pigs” ( AAFC, 1993). 
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 program for hog producers to evaluate and improve animal care practices on their farms and 
could be used as the basis for third party audits (Ontario Pork Council; CPC 2005b).  
Even though the initial aim was for a voluntary program, the ACA program implemented 
by the CEMA became an industry norm for egg producers. For example, after the release of the 
2002 code, the recommended housing space in a cage was increased from 64 to 67 square inches 
and from 70 to 75 square inches for white leghorn adult hens and brown birds, respectively. In 
addition, controlled moulting by methods involving deprivation of feed was to be phased out by 
2005 (CEMA 2002). A recent development, in the direction of more stringent FAW standards for 
the egg industry is the decision by the CEMA Board of Directors in November 2007 to make 
compliance with cage density a requirement for a passing score on the Animal Care Program
26. 
Second, the board approved a cage density policy that went into effect on April 1 2008 calling 
for producers with older cages to house white and brown leghorns at 64 and 70 square inches per 
hen respectively; for housing installed after 2003, white and brown leghorns must be housed at 
67 and 75 square inches (CEMA 2008, p.25). As these examples show, in some cases an industry 
has been able to self-regulate changes to FAW practices.   
The third choice for a livestock sector facing pressure from AROs and public opinion is 
that of actively seeking government oversight and regulation. Sometimes the government may 
choose not to act in verifying producers for their compliance with FAW standards and may leave 
this responsibility to the industry, as previously discussed. The extent to which government 
involvement in the verification process is needed may be addressed in public rounds of 
consultations with other stakeholders in the market. Regulatory oversight may be necessary in 
                                                 
26 The board passed a motion to make 85% the passing grade for the ACP as of April 2008, and to increase it to 90% 
a year later. A passing score will depend on meeting the cage density requirements set out in the new policy (CEMA 
2008 , p.25). 
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 the case of low levels of trust by consumers in the ability of other stakeholders to deliver credible 
FAW assurances, and resulting market failures in the provision of optimal levels of FAW. 
The fourth choice that individual producers and livestock associations have is third party 
certification and verification, which is discussed further in section 4.4. As an illustration, it is 
worth mentioning the cases of United Egg Producers (UEP) in the US and Aliments Breton 
Foods in Canada. The UEP, a trade association representing most US egg farmers, established 
animal welfare guidelines in 1999 and later introduced them as a voluntary program, i.e. the UEP 
Certified program, audited by third party organizations such as the USDA or Validus Services 
(see Appendix 1). Producers have several incentives to adhere to the relevant codes of practice 
established by an industry association, including protecting themselves against possible 
legislation breaches, making their production processes transparent for consumers, government 
and international markets, and minimizing the risk of disputes with welfare groups that affect 
producer income (DPIA, 2004). For example, the UEP and ISE America, a major New Jersey 
egg producer and one of the UEP’s member companies, were recently sued by the animal rights 
group Compassion Over Killing (COK) regarding potential consumer fraud over the UEP’s use 
of an old logo (UEP, 2008). However, the allegation by COK proved to be speculative since the 
UEP could offer as a defence its quality verification program audited by third parties. 
DuBreton, a 64-year-old family-run Canadian business specialized in hog farming and 
pork processing and located in Quebec, is the largest natural pork marketer in Canada and a 
major supplier in the US. The company claims to be “the first pork producer in North America 
that received third party certifications - i.e. Quality Assurance International, Humane Farm 
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 Animal Care, Agro-Com - for its natural and organic pork” (Aliments Breton Foods Canada, 
2008)
27.  
Clearly, producers can use a combination of these four alternatives in responding to 
pressure for products with FAW assurances. For example, Burnbrae Farms uses a combination of 
self and third party certifications in selling its free-run and organic eggs respectively (i.e., eggs 
that are laid by free run hens which are fed a organic multi-grain feed and contain no 
medications or antibiotics). Discerning the extent to which consumers trust producers’ quality 
assurances under different forms of certification and verification needs to be established through 
consumer research. 
The Role of Retailers, Restaurant Chains and Food Processors 
Downstream food firms, i.e. major retailers, restaurant chains, food processors, have 
influenced the development of private FAW standards as an alternative to the mandate of FAW 
practices by regulators. These firms attempt to satisfy customers’ needs as a means of 
increasing/protecting market share and revenues. With large scale, often global, operations these 
enterprises have been exposed to different trends in consumer attitudes, including campaigns by 
AROs. They have responded to increasing pressure from the public by advertising their policies 
on AW, setting up expert advisory bodies, and promoting adoption of higher standards by their 
suppliers of animal products. This approach characterizes the actions undertaken by some major 
restaurant chains (i.e. McDonald’s), meat processors (i.e. Maple Leaf Foods), or major food 
retailers (i.e. Safeway) (see Appendixes 4-5-6). 
                                                 
27  According the company,  “Quality Assurance International provides independent, third party certification of 
organic food, from field to shelf. As well, DuBreton’s products meet the Humane Farm Animal Care Program 
standards, which include nutritious diet without antibiotics, or hormones animals raised with shelter, resting areas, 
sufficient space and the ability to engage in natural behaviors. Agro-com, an independent organization, is 
responsible for monitoring the application of protocols for pork raised without antibiotics on a vegetable grain diet” 
(Aliments Breton Foods Canada, 2008).  
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 Downstream food firms also tend to wield considerable market power with respect to the 
set of atomistic livestock producers that are their suppliers. This market power may be used to 
push producer groups to set voluntary industry standards incorporating stringent AW conditions 
(e.g. the ACP adopted by the egg industry in Canada)
28. If standards are not met producers may 
be excluded from the market. The credibility of a retailer or processor’s standard to guarantee 
specific FAW attributes depends on the process of enforcement and verification as well as on the 
overall reputation of the food retailer/processor with respect to other food quality attributes (e.g. 
food safety, quality consistency). These firms use a combination of self-inspection (e.g. Maple 
Leaf) and/or third party audits (e.g. Safeway, Aliments Breton Foods) to verify quality.  
Blandford (2006) considers that the response of private food enterprises to perceived 
threats to their brand image is a key driver of change in the development of standards used in the 
handling of animals in North America. The fact that some of these firms sell food directly to 
consumers offers them the benefit of point-of-purchase communication with consumers. This is a 
two-fold benefit, which can either help them to understand consumer preferences related to FAW 
or to educate the public in this respect. At the same time, the use of the Internet as a source of 
supplemental information is a strategy that allows these firms to achieve these benefits while 
increasing consumers’ confidence in their brand. Firms can communicate specific actions, such 
the establishment of private AW standards, monitoring of their suppliers, etc. For examples on 
the use of the Web as a source of supplemental information see Appendix 7. 
                                                 
28 According to CEMA (2004) “The retail and restaurant sectors are encouraging producer groups to develop 
common verification systems, such as the egg industry’s Animal Care Program. Otherwise, individual retailers and 
restaurateurs may develop their own animal welfare purchasing specifications, thereby forcing producers to abide by 
different criteria depending on who they are supplying. Science-based animal care specifications provide assurances 




 In other cases, downstream food firms may not publicly advertise the actions undertaken 
to guarantee specific FAW attributes (i.e. free-run attribute for eggs under Loblaws’ “President 
Choice” Label). Instead, these firms rely upon a simple labelling claim to inform consumers
29. 
This approach needs to be consistent with the minimum legislative labelling requirements; the 
Canadian Food and Drugs Act prohibits the labelling or advertising of any food in a manner that 
is false, misleading or deceptive to consumers (CFIA, 2008b)
30. 
Returning to the credibility rules previously presented, we can assess the actions 
undertaken by these firms through the ‘trust criteria’. In general, these private enterprises show 
transparency in the provision of FAW to the market (i.e., information on how standards were 
developed, reviewed and verified are available to the public on the Internet). As well, their 
actions are based on public input since multiple stakeholders have the opportunity to comment 
on the development and revision and program standards (i.e., in the case of Safeway in the US: 
scientific experts from Safeway’s committee on AW and discussions with HSUS)
. Moreover, 
standards adopted by the private industry tend to be independently verified by a certifying 
organization. Finally, private industry standards vary but have the potential to be comprehensive, 
covering all aspects of animal care and handling from breeding to slaughter. This approach 
characterizes the hog farming programs adopted by pork processors – i.e., Aliments Breton 
Foods (see Appendix 7).  
                                                 
29 For example, “These Canada Grade A eggs are exclusively from free run hens. These hens live in an open 
concept, weather-sheltered barn environment, where they are free to roam, feed, roost, nest and perch (President 
Choice Brand, Free-Run Eggs). 
 
30 Subsection 5(1) of the Food and Drugs Act (FDA) prohibits the labelling, packaging, treating, processing, selling 
or advertising of any food (at all levels of trade) in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive to consumers or is 
likely to create an erroneous message regarding the character, value, quantity, composition, merit or safety of the 
product (CFIA, 2008b). 
 
27 
 The two main challenges these enterprises face in playing an important role in the FAW 
issue are their lack of expertise with respect to farming methods and their reluctance to become 
involved directly in monitoring farms’ activities. Downstream firms faced increased transaction 
costs if they must monitor their suppliers. Negative publicity arising from episodes of poor 
welfare at any stage of the production process can be extremely detrimental to a firm’s image 
and accumulated good will. Thus, the extent to which these firms will become involved in 
establishing and enforcing private AW standards depends on the strength of the market 
incentives for them to do so.  
The Role of Third Party Enterprises 
In some cases farmer groups, retailers, restaurant chains and processors are able to obtain 
third party certification for their production practices — that is, a respected outside organization 
provides information that is believable to buyers. A third party offers certification and 
verification services (through an assessment and audit process) sometimes using industry 
standards as the basis for the certification process. There are some cases when these 
organizations provide a series of services including standard setting, e.g. defining industry 
practices that improve AW. The outside organization providing third party services can take 
many forms, including consumer groups, producer associations, specialized third party testing 
and certification organizations, national governments, and international organizations 
(MacDonald, 2005). In some countries, the government provides an accreditation program to 
lend credibility to private sector quality assurance programs; examples include the USDA 
Process Verification Program and USDA Quality System Assessment program. These are third 
party certification systems developed by the USDA to ensure compliance with specified 
production and processing protocols. Canada does not have a similar program offered by the 
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 Federal government. In Canada, the third party certification services are offered by either private 
certification enterprises or by non-profit organizations. For instance, the SPCA Certified 
program, the WHS Certified program or the Certified Humane Raised&Handled are independent 
third party certification systems offered by the British Columbia Society for Protection of 
Cruelty to Animals (BC SPCA) and The Winnipeg Humane Society (WHS) from Canada, and 
Humane Farm Animal Care from the US, respectively (see Appendix 8).  
There are a number of reasons why livestock producers pursue a third party certification 
and verification program in FAW (Dotson, 2007). First, the processor or retailer to which the 
livestock producers market their product requires compliance. Second, livestock producers may 
wish to capture additional margin or market share and to differentiate themselves in highly 
competitive markets. This strategy characterizes the actions undertaken by the egg producer 
Burnbrae Farms (i.e. organic eggs laid by free-run hens fed without antibiotics which are assured 
by the third party: Quality Assurance International) and the pork producer Aliments Breton 
Foods Canada. DuBreton differentiates its products by highlighting on the label certain credence 
features - i.e. pork chops that have been sourced from pigs feed with natural grains and without 
antibiotics (see Appendix 9). In addition, DuBreton emphasizes the fact that pork has been 
produced in a certified program by third party enterprises, i.e. Quality Assurance International, 
Humane Farm Animal Care, Agro-Com. Third, producers want to identify and correct any AW 
challenges before they become an issue of focus for AROs, i.e. the aforementioned legal suit 
filed by the COK against the UEP. 
As Dotson (2007) notes, some retailers are beginning to require third party certification 
of their suppliers. Companies with this experience indicate they recognize value in five areas: 
developing and expanding market opportunities, building brand equity and reputation, the ability 
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 to manage risks, and assurance that food meets their criteria for social responsibility. For 
example, Safeway’s (U.S and Canada) overall commitment to animal welfare includes an audit 
program conducted by a rotating team of internal and independent auditors
31. Applying the 
previous credibility rule to third party certification and verification, it appears to be measurable, 
verifiable, and defendable. As regards to the trust criteria, the nature of the independent audit 
performed by third party enterprises might enhance consumers’ trust in a program. For example, 
in the US, those implementing quality programs on animal welfare can employ first, second, and 
third party audits
32. Neither the first nor the second party audit qualifies as an independent audit, 
thus leading to a conflict of interest and a possible weakening of consumer trust.  
 
The Role of Media 
The media is likely to be instrumental in influencing public concern over perceived food 
safety risks, “unnatural” farming practices, AW questions and possible environmental dangers of 
agriculture practices. They are also beneficiaries, as problems in these areas are likely to be 
newsworthy (Whiting, 2005b). According to Meredith (2000), the role of the media is to provide 
their audience with informed comment and news on public issues as well as to increase the size 
of the audience. In the context of the FAW issue, the possible weaknesses of the media are the 
temptation to inflame conflicts or sensationalize issues related to AW and a lack of experience in 
                                                 
31 Safeway publicly released the names the names of the third party audit firms approved for inspections of its 
suppliers (see Appendix 6) 
 
32 Swanson (2007) notes that the following types of audits are used in the U.S: 
•  First Party Audit: conducted by a designated employee or manager on site at a designated random frequency, 
recommended for identifying problems and areas for improvement: self study, preparation for a second or 
third party audit  
•  Second Party Audit:  conducted by a paid consultant or affiliated industry organization - less frequent than 
the first party audit, provides outside expertise and evaluation preparation for third party audit  
•  Third Party Audit: uses evaluation instrument, independence from party to be audited, auditor does not 
participate in problem solving or education of the producer: they are there to audit. 
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 understanding FAW issues. Despite these weaknesses the media still has an opportunity to 
provide a constructive forum for information provision and debate. The extent to which 
Canadian consumers have been (and continue to be) influenced by media representations of 
animal welfare issues could be established through consumer research. 
The Role of Animal Rights Organizations  
Animal rights organizations (AROs) no longer rely solely on traditional legislative means 
to achieve their objectives. Rather than primarily lobbying for better laws or stricter enforcement 
of existing laws, they have also focused on the marketing chain, either through affecting 
consumer choice directly or forcing food firms to be proactive for fear of a negative consumer 
reaction (Whiting, 2005a)
33.  
Some AROs may not tolerate any level of suffering by an animal. They may disagree on 
principle with the use of animals for the production of meat, dairy, eggs and fibres. Other AROs 
accept the role of animals in production agriculture as long as they do not suffer unnecessarily 
(DPIA, 2004). Meredith (2000) considers that the main goal of activists is to improve the quality 
of life for farm animals, such as the Canadian Coalition for Farm Animals (CCFA)
34. The 
strengths of AROs are a caring image, as well as a perception that they occupy the moral “high 
ground”. The disadvantages of AROs can be their failure to take into consideration the economic 
                                                 
33 For instance, PETA organized campaigns to maximize the domino effect in the form of a request to increase the 
minimum cage size for laying hens in McDonald’s supply chain which reportedly later triggered slightly larger 
minimum cage sizes in Burger King’s supply chain (Whiting, 2005a after Mealey, 2002). A campaign organized by 
PETA and HSUS in 2007 contributed to the phase out of gestation stalls by Smithfield on January 25 2008 followed 
by a similar movement by Maple Leaf on January 31 2008.  
 
34 According to its’ website, the Canadian Coalition for Farm Animals (CCFA) is “dedicated to promoting the 
welfare of animals raised for food in Canada through public education, legislative change and consumer choice. 
CCFA supporters are animal-protection organizations across Canada representing over 120,000 Canadians”. The 
CCFA (2008) states that its’ goals to educate Canadians about “the realities of factory farming and its impact on 
animals, to promote more-humane consumer choices and to achieve a legislated ban on battery cages and sow stalls 
in Canada through provincial and/or federal legislation” (CCFA, 2008). 
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 realities within which farm businesses operate and the subjective approach to FAW issues that 
may not be grounded in the scientific realities of animal behaviour and welfare. Nevertheless, 
AROs still represent a potentially important vehicle for communication and dialogue with 
respect to FAW issues. 
The Role of Scientific Experts  
Some commentators argue that the role of science as the pre-eminent underpinning of 
good public policy has been challenged by public opinion. Whiting (2005a), for example, argues 
that science, in its intended form, is a directed linear process designed as an objective search for 
truth, whereas public opinion is by nature subjective and temporary. Certainly, the level of public 
concern over new food technologies (e.g. genetically modified organisms) in some countries 
would lend credence to this view of a growing dichotomy between public opinion and science. In 
some cases, apparently conflicting scientific evidence can cause confusion or suspicion among 
consumers. From the perspective of informing debate around AW, the key strength of credible 
scientific experts is their objectivity, independence, and expertise. However, the AW debate 
cannot be solved by science alone, and the means by which scientific findings are communicated 
to the broader public is crucial. Meredith (2000) suggests that the opportunities scientists face are 
to foster objective understanding of the needs of livestock, and to devise economic and practical 
ways of meeting these needs. The extent to which scientists are (or could be) a trusted source of 
information on AW issues in Canada is a relevant question for future consumer research.  
Overview of Stakeholder Incentives and Preferences 
Given the potential for market failures in the context of AW outlined above, it is useful to 
review the incentives for each of the key stakeholders to contribute toward improving farm 
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 animal welfare. An approach used by the Department of Primary Industries Australia is depicted 
in Figure I. It presents the incentives for key stakeholders and the roles that different mechanisms 
























Maximum Welfare  No Welfare 
 
 
Figure I. Market failure and animal welfare. 
Source: DPIA 2004 Animal Welfare Report , Biosecurity Victoria 
 
It is assumed that the enterprises operating at the far left of the scale in the Figure I, i.e. 
low AW practices, will be unprofitable (as well as cruel) because animals that suffer are not 
productive. As an incremental improvement in AW (i.e. a shift to the right) will improve profits, 
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 there are economic (as well as moral) incentives for producers to improve welfare beyond the 
‘low welfare’ point. A shift along the scale has the following interpretation. At point A, one can 
find producers with a low level of AW standards or no concern for AW, but they must still 
comply with legal minimum standards/laws protecting animals against cruelty (DPIA, 2004).  
Next, Point B is the most profitable level of AW, the point at which the productivity gain 
from improving AW no longer covers the cost of achieving the AW improvement. Then, it is 
further hypothesized that society expects a standard of FAW located at point C, higher than that 
represented by point B. If the public knew the conditions in which animals were raised, then 
point C could have been considered the minimum legislated AW standard. When a producer 
employs AW practices resulting in a lower level of AW, it can damage the image of the whole 
industry, hence, there is a reason for the industry collectively to challenge producers to meet 
certain AW standards that exceed the legislated minimum. These higher standards, defined 
through industry-specific AW codes, are meant to improve the perception of the industry among 
consumers, and are designed to support producers in defending themselves against legal action. 
When producers operate according to these codes (point D), they exceed the legislative 
requirements for AW (point C) (DPIA, 2004).  
Some consumers are more concerned about AW standards and may be willing to pay a 
price premium for products with additional levels of AW. If there is significant number of AW 
conscious consumers, producers may be able to capture a premium by delivering a more 
stringent standard of AW which is located at point E. The producer’s ability to get the premium 
also relies on an information mechanism, such as labelling, that can credibly communicate the 
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 higher AW status to consumers. The hypothetical point of maximum AW lies somewhere 
beyond E but is a difficult concept to define (DPIA, 2004)
35. 
Consumer Preferences and Quality Assurances for Credence Attributes: A 
Review of Key Literature   
This section reviews a sampling of the literature on information asymmetry and the role 
of the private and public sectors in providing quality assurances for credence attributes such as 
food safety, animal welfare, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This literature informs 
the subsequent welfare analysis in Section 6.0. 
There is a body of theoretical work that uses a game theoretic approach to characterize 
the relationships between players in the markets for credence goods. This research provides 
valuable insights into consumers’ behaviour and the role of producers in providing quality 
assurances. Caswell (1998) outlines these market effects in the context of labelling foods that are 
produced with the use of biotechnology, organically grown, or use an animal welfare-friendly 
production process. She concludes that the market effects depend on consumer perceptions of 
credence attributes, the benefits and costs of labelling for companies, and the goals of 
government policy. McCluskey (2000) uses a game theoretic approach to analyze the 
relationships between producers/retailers and consumers and to highlight the information issues 
that are present in the market for quality differentiated products with asymmetric information 
(i.e., organic foods and AW). The author finds that repeated-purchase relationships and third 
party monitoring are required for high quality credence goods to be available in the market. The 
                                                 
35 DPIA (2004) notes that :``an extreme definition would be that animals are no longer slaughtered for meat. 
However, this would probably be unacceptable to almost all members of society. Furthermore, without a market for 
meat products, the population of meat animals would need to be drastically cut, itself creating a major economic 
issue`` (p.15). 
35 
 author also addresses the role of distributors and retailers in providing information on organic 
food to consumers.  
Hobbs (2004) explores the role of food traceability systems in resolving information 
asymmetry related to food safety as well as food quality. She uses a model of ex-ante quality 
verification and ex-post traceability systems to demonstrate the different functions and incentives 
of a traceability system, and explores whether providing consumers with information about on-
farm production methods enables them to make a more informed choice about the relative safety 
of a food product. Industry-wide quality assurance programs that incorporate animal welfare or 
environmentally friendly production guarantees are likely to be a more efficient means of 
reducing consumers’ information asymmetry, assuming these schemes are credible.  
Another body of theoretical work employs mathematical modelling with the aim of 
understanding consumers’ behaviour, private sector incentives and the public sector’s role in 
establishing quality standards for products with credence attributes. Carriquiry et al. (2003) 
model the optimal degree of assurance in a processor’s quality control system over the 
procurement of agricultural output when there is uncertainty about quality. Their model predicts 
that the optimal degree of assurance depends on the likelihood that the sought-after attribute is 
discernable by consumers, the price premium paid for the attribute, the cost of quality control, 
and the damage caused by false certification. A number of privately-developed  U.S. quality 
assurance standards, such as T.G.I Friday’s, Angus Beef, Niman Ranch Farm, and those of fast-
food chains are examined for the purpose of seeing how well the model’s predictions are 
supported.  
Carriquiry and Babcock (2007) develop a model of repeated purchases to explore how 
quality discoverability, market structure, the nature of reputations, market premiums, and 
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 discount factors drive firm choice regarding the stringency of quality assurance systems designed 
to gain consumer trust. The authors find that the protection of reputation is a key incentive for 
firms to invest in high quality goods and quality assurance systems.  
Similarly, Roe and Sheldon (2007) use a model of vertical product differentiation to 
analyze the labelling of credence goods (i.e., organically-produced food, dolphin-safe tuna, free-
range poultry, and GMOs). More specifically, they focus on the manner by which quality is 
communicated. Their results clearly indicate that firms prefer private labelling options. In 
addition, firms may hire private certifiers and may pay for mandated government labels when the 
government’s quality benchmark substantially deviates from firms’ private quality choices. The 
authors’ analysis suggests that the average consumer prefers a mandatory discrete label with a 
high-quality standard, while poor consumers prefer a mandatory discrete label with a low quality 
standard. 
A final body of theoretical work uses a combination of mathematical modeling and 
graphical analysis to derive the equilibrium and welfare arising from markets for credence goods. 
Bureau et al. (1998) study a no-labelling and a mandatory-labelling regime in the context of the 
EU versus the US beef hormone dispute. They start from the assumption that hormone-free beef 
is the high-quality product, while hormone-treated beef is the low-quality product. The authors 
assume two groups of producers (hormone-free and hormone-treated) that are homogeneous 
within each group; consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their preferences toward 
hormone-treated beef. In the initial market scenario, the EU farmers are forbidden from 
producing hormone-treated beef, while later they are allowed to produce hormone-treated beef. 
The authors do not conclude that introducing hormone-treated beef may reduce total welfare. 
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 Lence and Hayes (2005) develop a framework for examining price and welfare effects 
from the introduction of GM products. They introduce a method to model heterogeneity among 
producers and consumers in the short- and long-run, and evaluate the welfare impacts. In the 
short run, the non-GM good becomes another identity-preserved product but in the long-run 
some of the non-GM may become blended with the GM. The long-run results show that under 
reasonable circumstances (i.e., when the production cost-saving impact of the GM technology is 
high and consumers are not concerned about GM), consumer and producer welfare is larger after 
the introduction of the GM technology.  
Anania and Nistico (2004) use a graphical analysis of the decisions that producers and 
consumers of credence goods (which are considered high quality) make in three institutional 
scenarios. In their first case a regulation provides consumers with a fully credible guarantee (i.e., 
if a product is sold as being of high quality it is indeed high quality). Their second scenario is the 
other extreme when there is no third party to provide consumers with a remedy for the lack of 
information and it is therefore impossible for trust to develop. All producers of low quality goods 
can offer their products to consumers on the high quality good market. The third case assumes 
that the regulation cannot be fully trusted by consumers, but now a market for the high quality 
good develops. The authors find that producers of high quality goods are better off when a fully 
credible regulation exists. As well, some of the producers of low quality goods benefit by 
cheating under a less than fully credible regulation.  
Finally, Babcock et al. (2002) use a graphical analysis to measure the welfare effects of 
adopting animal welfare guidelines in the US egg industry. This decision creates a bifurcated 
market of high-cost shell eggs and low-cost eggs that are processed. The major finding of the 
paper is that the supply of graders would decrease in response to the increasing cost of welfare-
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 friendly technology and the market equilibrium price of the ‘friendly’ eggs would be higher. 
Consumers’ benefit from egg consumption would decrease; any psychic benefit of consuming 
eggs from animal friendly production practices is not accounted for. The impact on producers’ 
benefit from production remains ambiguous. Further, the restriction in the movement of low-cost 
eggs into the in-shell market in periods of peak demand increases the price of in-shell eggs and 
decreases the price of eggs destined for processing. The producers of in-shell eggs are the 
winners in this case. 
The empirical literature on consumer trust in the institutions that provide them with 
quality assurances for different credence attributes is relatively rich. The most relevant works for 
the purposes of this study are reviewed below. 
Frewer et al. (2005) elicit the perceptions of a sample of Dutch consumers on animal 
husbandry practices for farmed pigs and farmed fish. A particular issue addressed in their survey 
is consumers’ perceptions of different institutions (i.e., government, farmers and retailers) with 
respect to how trustworthy, knowledgeable, and accountable these institutions are, as well as the 
perceived vested interest in developing animal husbandry systems. The authors find that farmers 
and the government are perceived to be equally accountable regarding their activities, unlike 
supermarkets, which are rated as being relatively less accountable. Farmers and the government 
are also rated as being more trustworthy and knowledgeable compared to retailers, particularly in 
the case of pigs. Farmers are rated as being more knowledgeable than the government. All of the 
food chain actors are perceived to be protecting their own vested interests with regard to how 
they handle AW issues. 
Huffman et al. (2004) elicit the perception of US consumers on the trustworthiness of 
various institutions with respect to the provision of information on genetically modified foods. 
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 The authors formulate and empirically test various hypotheses about the role that consumer 
characteristics (i.e., household income, personal and social capital, prior beliefs) play in the 
formation of trust in information sources. The results show that an individual’s household 
income has no significant effect on relative trust, but an increase in his/her schooling lowers the 
probability of trusting information from government, private industry or organizations, 
environmental or consumer groups, or “other” sources relative to information from an 
independent third party source. People who claimed to be informed about genetic modification 
before the survey were more likely to trust the government than the third party sources. Relative 
levels of trust in government are likely to differ between countries given differences in the 
institutional, historical and cultural environments within those countries. 
In a similar vein, Kjaernes and Larvik (2007) surveyed consumers in a number of 
European countries to elicit their perception on FAW and levels of trust. They find that there is a 
clear differentiation between various types of actors with respect to perceptions of truth-telling in 
the case of an animal welfare scandal. Specifically, they find that food experts, consumer 
organizations, animal protectionists, and food authorities generally were the most trusted to 
provide truthful information. 
Christensen et al. (2004) used focus groups and street surveys in the US and the UK to 
determine consumer perceptions of the ability of different agencies, associations, and groups to 
certify beef products for quality, food safety, animal welfare, social responsibility, and 
environmental responsibility. They find that US consumers see the role of the Federal 
government primarily as assuring food safety, but desire the private sector to make other types of 
certifications. In contrast, consumers in the UK preferred the private sector to assure food safety. 
As regards animal welfare, the US consumers see the USDA, producers and special interest 
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 groups as playing a critical role in assuring this attribute. Consumers surveyed in the UK 
preferred that the national government and interest groups certify AW. 
Miller and Unnevehr (2001) conducted a telephone survey on a sample of 609 consumers 
living in Illinois and assessed their perceptions of food safety with respect to pork consumption. 
The authors asked questions about the frequency of fresh pork consumption, consumer concerns 
about pork products and their safety, consumers’ willingness to pay for certified safer pork 
products, and consumers’ confidence in certifying institutions. The major findings of the survey 
were that most consumers have some concerns about pork safety. Households with children, 
those with lower incomes, and older consumers tended to exhibit the strongest concerns. 
Consumers had more confidence in USDA certification of enhanced pork safety than in industry 
certification. As well, most of the consumers indicated that they were willing to pay a price 
premium for a certified safer product. 
Finally, Coleman and Hay (2004) elicited public opinion in Australia regarding the 
purchase of livestock products, specifically pork, and egg products
36. They examined the 
relationship between general (i.e. community behaviours) and behaviour-specific (i.e. individual 
consumer) attitudes toward animal welfare, health and environmental issues in the pork 
industry.They determine the consequences of these attitudes on people’s consumption behaviour 
(e.g., buying pork) and other important outcomes, including membership of animal welfare 
groups, petitioning and lobbying politicians, processors and retailers. The authors find that 
attitude variables predicted around 10% of the variability in pork consumption but predicted 28% 
of the variability in people’s activities in opposition to farming in general. They conclude that 
                                                 
36 Coleman and Hay (2004) - The sample of consumers was surveyed using a generic “Farming and the 
Community” survey and an industry specific “Pork Farming and the Community”. The total sample of 691 
respondents comprised 481 females and 208 males. Of these, 464 also completed the questionnaires specific to the 
pork industry and of these 464, 125 were interviewed at the point of sale. 
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 people’s attitudes are more likely to translate into community behaviours which are duly 
responded to by the media and perhaps by politicians than they are to determine buying 
behaviour. Moreover, the authors suggest that community attitudes about animal welfare should 
be taken into account both in developing marketing strategies as well as in developing policies 
related to food quality issues. 
Welfare Analysis of the Market for Animal Friendly Products: The Case of 
Pork Products in Canada 
This section presents an economic welfare analysis of the implications of adopting 
‘animal-friendly’ production standards for Canadian pork products. A graphical analysis for six 
potential situations is presented.  
The analysis assumes that Canadian pork producers use one of two distinct production 
systems. The first group uses intensive production methods to obtain conventional pork (CP), 
while the second group uses production methods to obtain pork with animal-friendly attributes 
(FP). The FP methods are characterized by: no growth promotants or antibiotics, lower densities 
for animals in the barns, no use of gestation crates, access to the outdoors, and continuous access 
to feed and water. FP production typically takes place on operations with smaller animal 
numbers. The CP methods are the antithesis of these FP protocols. As a result, there are 
differences in productivity between the two methods, with those farms using CP methods having 
higher productivity. Thus, the CP producers have lower production costs than the FP producers. 
For the purpose of this analysis, both groups of producers are assumed to be price takers. FP 
producers are assumed to obtain the FP certification at no charge. Finally, it is assumed that FP 
producers never find it profitable to sell their products on the CP market. 
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 In the model, consumers are also divided into two groups according to their preferences 
for pork. The first group (A) includes consumers who are indifferent between CP and FP, while 
the second group (B) includes individuals who prefer FP to CP. Consumers from both groups are 
assumed to know the relative cost structure of CP and FP. This assumption is supported by 
empirical evidence – i.e., consumers in the US are aware of the fact that FP producers have 
higher production costs than the CP producers and, therefore, need to charge higher prices for 
their products
37. 
In the first instance, consumers are assumed to have full information on the regulation of 
FP voluntary labelling and the extent to which any CP producers cheat by falsely labelling their 
products as FP. This assumption is later relaxed. Finally, it is assumed that the B group of 
consumers perceive FP as being of higher quality than CP, therefore, are willing to pay a higher 
price for the FP than for the CP. That is, vertical product differentiation between the two 
categories of pork products is assumed. Our last assumption is based on the results of a number 
of consumer surveys (see Appendix 10 for a summary). These surveys concluded that consumers 
in various countries perceive products incorporating animal-friendly attributes as being of higher 
quality than those produced using conventional methods. As well, these studies concluded that 
some consumers are willing to pay a premium for the former relative to the latter products. 
Six potential market situations are analyzed with respect to the total welfare that is 
generated in the market. In the first scenario, only CP is produced and consumed in Canada. In 
the second scenario, voluntary standards for FP production are developed and production of FP 
starts. In addition, some consumers develop a preference for and express a higher willingness to 
                                                 
37 Norwood et al. (2007), in a national survey eliciting the opinion of US consumers about farm animal welfare, 
included several questions to ascertain whether individuals associated improvements in farm animal welfare with 
higher meat prices, and if so, whether they were willing to accept such price rises. The majority of consumers (i.e., 
74%) believed that improvements in animal well-being would lead to higher meat prices.  
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 pay for pork produced to FP standards. In order to allow these consumers to distinguish between 
CP and FP, the FP producers voluntarily decide to label their products. This scenario depicts the 
case when regulation is such that no CP producer cheats by falsely labelling his products as FP 
and, therefore, the voluntary label is fully credible.  
In the third market outcome we relax the perfect information assumption. Consumers 
have little or no trust in the voluntary label because regulation (or lack of) is such that all CP 
producers can mislabel their products as FP; this case is equivalent to that when there is no 
labelling of FP. The relaxation of the perfect information assumption is still maintained in the 
fourth scenario. This time, however, consumers find the FP label relatively credible as stronger 
regulation of FP labelling is such that only a very small number of CP producers mislabel their 
products as FP.  
In the fifth market outcome, a mandatory standard is imposed by the government, so that 
only FP can be produced and consumed. In this scenario it is assumed that Canada bans imports 
of foreign CP. This assumption is relaxed in the sixth scenario when the Canadian government 
implements and manages an official quality label that signals the animal-friendly attribute of the 
FP produced domestically. In this case consumers trust that the label accurately portrays the 
product. 
For convenience, it is assumed that the Canadian pork sector is as competitive as the 
average foreign pork sector, so that Canada does not take part in international trade in any of the 
first five cases. The analysis of cases 2, 3 and 4 draws upon the work by Anania and Nistico 
(2004) and Hoehn and Deaton (2004).  
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 Anania and Nistico (2004) present an analysis of producers’ and consumers’ decisions 
with respect to credence goods in three institutional scenarios that reflect different levels of 
credibility of the relevant regulation and, therefore, different levels of trust placed by consumers 
in the quality of the product. The situation of vertical product differentiation between FP and CP 
that we consider in our analysis – i.e., different slopes and intercepts for the CP and the FP 
demand curves – is grounded in Anania and Nistico’s assumption that “consumers are willing to 
buy products of both qualities (i.e., FP and CP), although they prefer the high quality to the low 
quality and are ready to pay a higher price for it” (Anania and Nistico, 2004). Similarly, Hoehn 
and Deaton (2004) examine the case of certified labelling for credence attributes using the 
concepts of pooled and separating equilibria. In this analysis, they consider a high credence good 
called the credence product and a low credence good called the conventional product. The 
demands for these products differ by a constant, representing consumers’ WTP for the credence 
characteristic, but the demand curves have the same slope. In a similar fashion to the work by 
Anania and Nistico (2004), third party certified labelling vertically differentiates the two 
products and two separate markets replace a single pooled market.  
 
Case 1 
Initially, only CP is produced and consumed in Canada. Consumers are assumed to have 
homogeneous preferences – no consumers with a preference for FP yet exist. Supply is given by 
S, while demand is given by D in Figure 1. The equilibrium price and quantity that prevail in the 
market are Pe and Qe, respectively. The total welfare that is generated (i.e., area AEB) equals 










Some consumers are assumed to have developed a preference for and express a higher 
willingness to pay for pork produced to FP standards. The two groups of consumers are thus 
formed. As well, some pork producers voluntarily switch their production method from CP to 
FP. The FP is produced according to voluntary standards, such as the Animal Care Assessment 
program implemented by the Canadian Pork Council, the SPCA Certified standard of BC SPCA 
or the WHS Certified standard of the Winnipeg Humane Society. The higher costs associated 
with FP production are reflected by Sf  in Figure 2. Assuming that FP production is not 
significant enough to cause an increase in the price of inputs for CP, the supply of CP is still 
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The FP producers voluntarily decide to label their products to allow the B consumers to 
identify which production method has been used. In this scenario, it is assumed that regulation is 
such that no CP producer cheats by falsely labelling his products as FP. Risking their reputation 
in the eyes of consumers is a primary reason that the CP producers refrain from falsely 
advertising their products as being FP. As a result, the B consumers fully trust the FP label and 
therefore reveal their maximum willingness to pay for FP. Their demand is given by Df in Figure 
2. Demand for CP rotates inwards from D to Dc, as a result of some consumers switching from 
CP to FP.  
In this case the CP and the FP can be treated as being two different goods with well 
separated markets. The equilibria in the two markets are depicted in Figure 2. The equilibrium 
price and quantity in the CP market – i.e., Pc0 and Qc0, decrease compared to their levels in the 
first scenario. This is the result of the decrease in demand for CP, as some consumers switch 
from CP to FP. The FP market clears at Pf0 and Qf0. The price premium for the FP is given by 

























  C P   M a r k e t         F P   M a r k e t  
 
Figure 2: Market equilibria under voluntary labelling that is fully credible  
 
The total welfare in this scenario is given by the sum of the welfare that is generated in 
each of the two markets. Specifically, the welfare that is generated in the CP market (i.e., area 
AEc0B) equals the A consumers’ surplus (i.e., area AEc0Pc0) plus the CP producers’ surplus 
(i.e., area Pc0Ec0B). The welfare that is generated in the FP market (i.e., area CEf0F) equals the 
B consumers’ surplus (i.e., area CEf0Pf0) plus the FP producers’ surplus (i.e., area Pf0Ef0F).  
 
Case 3 
This scenario is the antithesis of the previous one – i.e., consumers have little or no trust 
in the voluntary label applied by the FP producers; this case is equivalent to that when there is no labelling of FP. The reason for the lack of trust is that all CP producers can, without legally 
abrogating a regulation, sell their CP products on the FP market. Risking their reputation in the 
eyes of consumers is no longer a sufficient deterrent for the CP producers to not mislead 
consumers. For this case we relax our initial assumption of perfect information so that consumers 
are no longer assumed to have full information on the regulation of FP voluntary labelling and 
the extent to which CP producers cheat by falsely labelling their products as FP. Uncertainty 
over quality exists. Following Anania and Nistico (2004), the supply in the FP market for prices 
below F coincides with that in the CP market when the voluntary label is fully credible, as no FP 
producer finds it profitable to produce, and the FP market is supplied by CP producers only. 
When the price exceeds F, both the FP and the CP producers are offering their products on the 
FP market. As a result, the supply of FP is given by the horizontal summation of S and Sf, and is 
denoted by Sf’ in Figure 3.  
It is assumed that consumers are still willing to pay a premium for pork offered on the FP 
market as long as the price that is charged is greater than F, as they face a positive probability of 
buying FP. However, their willingness to pay is much lower than in the case when they fully 
trust the label. This is captured by the clockwise inward rotation in the demand for FP - labelled 
pork from Df to Df’. Moreover, consumers are not willing to buy any product offered on the FP 
market at prices below F, as they know that F is the minimum price that FP producers require to 
start producing FP, therefore, a product offered at a price below F can only be CP. 
   The outcomes on the two markets are represented in Figure 3. Competition between the 
FP and the CP producers on the FP market will make the CP producers offer their product at a 
price just below F, which is the minimum entry price for the FP producers. At this price, 
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 consumers will not buy any product they are offered as FP, since they know that at that price the 
product can only be CP. As a result, the FP market collapses and the CP producers have to sell 
their products on the CP market. In this case, the supply of CP is equal to the supply of CP under 
voluntary labelling that is fully credible – i.e., S in Figure 3. It is assumed that at least some of 
the B consumers (those who only weakly prefer FP and are now unable to buy FP at a higher 
price) join the A consumers, making the demand for CP expand with respect to that in the 
previous scenario – i.e., Dc’ in Figure 3. 
   
 


























Figure 3: Market equilibria when there is no labelling, or  
when consumers have little or no trust in the voluntary label  
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 The CP price and the quantity of CP that is marketed exceed those that emerge on the 
market when labelling of FP is fully credible because now no FP production can take place and 
CP is substituted for FP by some of the B consumers. 
The surplus that is earned by both the A and B consumers is given by area AEc’Pc’ in 
Figure 3. The B consumers, unable to buy FP at a higher price, are not getting any surplus. They 
are worse off as the FP market collapses. The total consumer surplus in case 3 is lower than that 
enjoyed by the consumers (both A and B) in case 2. The CP producers earn surplus equal to area 
Pc’Ec’B and are better off compared to the case of fully credible FP labelling. Conversely, the 
FP producers are worse off, as they have to exit the FP market. The total welfare that is 
generated in the remaining CP market is given by area AEc’B. 
 
Case 4 
In this scenario, it is assumed that regulation of FP labelling is such that only a very small 
number of CP producers mislabel their products as FP, so that consumers find the FP label 
relatively credible. The initial assumption of perfect information is again relaxed. Following 
Anania and Nistico (2004), the supply of CP (i.e., Sc” in Figure 4) decreases with the quantity of 
CP that is offered on the FP market. The total quantity of product that is offered on the FP 
market by both the FP and the CP producers is given by Sf” in Figure 4. The large probability of 
buying a “true” FP on the FP market allows for a higher willingness to pay for the FP, 
represented by Df” in Figure 4. The number of those consumers willing to buy FP at a higher 
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 price that switch to the CP market due to concerns over the credibility of FP labelling is smaller 






































  C P   M a r k e t         F P   M a r k e t  
 
Figure 4: Market equilibria under voluntary labelling that is relatively credible  
 
The equilibrium price that emerges in the FP market is Pf” (this price is lower than the 
equilibrium price of FP when the label is fully credible). At this price, the B consumers buy Qft” 
units of FP-labelled pork, of which: Qff” units are FP and Qfc” units are CP. Their surplus 
equals area CEf”Pf”. The FP producers enjoy surplus equal to area Pf”GF – they are worse off 
compared to the case of a fully credible voluntary label, but better off compared to the case of no 
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 or little consumer trust in the content of the label. The price that clears the CP market is Pc” and 
the quantity of CP that is exchanged on the CP market at this price is Qcc”. The surplus that 
consumers get from buying CP is equal to area AEc”Pc”. CP producers earn surplus equal to 
area Pc”Ec”B from sales of CP to the CP market and area GEf”HBF from sales of CP to the FP 




This scenario depicts a situation in which all domestic pork producers adopt friendly 
production methods (i.e., intensive production methods are banned in Canada – such as the 
phased-in policy developed by the CEMA for the egg industry in Canada since 2003). There is a 
unique standard that domestic pork producers have to comply with. It is assumed that this 
mandatory standard is more stringent than the voluntary standards that FP producers use to 
assess the animal-friendliness of their production methods in scenarios 2-4. As a result, the FP 
production costs increase under the mandatory standard – i.e., the supply of FP shifts from Sf to 
Sfm’ in Figure 5.  
While some of the CP producers are expected to exit the market, most of them are 
assumed to switch to producing FP according to the mandatory standard. As a result, the 
domestic FP production increases (i.e., supply of FP rotates from Sfm’ to Sfm in Figure 5). In this 
scenario, it is assumed that imports of CP are not allowed. On the demand side, the A consumers 
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 are willing to buy FP when its price falls below A. Thus, the aggregate demand for FP, Dfm, is 
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  Qfm  Qf 
 
Figure 5: Market equilibrium under mandatory FP standard and autarky  
 
The equilibrium price of FP under the mandatory standard, Pfm, lies below the price of 
FP under voluntary labelling (both when the label is fully credible and when it is relatively 
credible). However, it is not low enough to allow the A consumers (who are indifferent between 
CP and FP) to substitute the CP for FP, so that the equilibrium quantity of FP that is marketed, 
Qfm, goes only to the B consumers.  
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 Under this scenario, the B consumers enjoy surplus equal to area CEfmPfm. The 
economic surplus that accrues to the FP producers is given by area PfmEfmI. Thus, the total 
welfare that is generated in the pork market under the mandatory FP standard and no imports of 
CP is given by area CEfmI and is smaller than the total welfare under voluntary labelling (both 
when the label is fully credible and when it is relatively credible). The main reason for this 
outcome is the welfare loss suffered by the group A consumers and by CP producers. The group 
A consumers suffer from the absence of choice between the FP and the cheaper CP. As well, the 
CP producers lose as a result of this mandatory FP standard, as some of them have to incur 
additional costs to comply with the FP standard while others have to exit the market.  
If a cheaper substitute for the FP were available, the group A consumers would prefer to 
switch to that substitute. One source of substitute would be imported CP. The assumption of 
autarky will be relaxed in the next section. Moreover, in order to allow the group B consumers to 
distinguish between the domestic FP and the imported CP, and to ensure fair competition 
between domestic FP producers and foreign CP producers, the government is assumed to 
implement and manage an official quality label, which signals the animal-friendly attribute of the 
FP produced domestically. Implementing this label involves a cost, C, of management, 
enforcement and advertisement. This situation is analysed in Case 6. 
 
Case 6 
For simplicity, we assume that foreign CP producers incur the same production costs as 
would Canadian CP producers in the previous scenarios (i.e., foreign supply of CP is given by S 
in Figure 6). Again, the supply of domestic FP is given by Sfm. Since domestic consumers can 
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 distinguish between the domestic FP and the foreign CP, we are faced with two separate 
demands. Assuming that elasticity of demand for imported CP is equal to the elasticity of 
demand for domestic CP (i.e., if domestic CP was allowed), we have Df and Dc defining the 
domestic demand for domestic FP and the domestic demand for foreign CP, respectively. The 
equilibrium prices are Pfm for the FP market and Pc0 for the (imported) CP market. The quantity 
of FP that is produced domestically is given by Qfm, while the quantity of CP that is imported is 
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Figure 6: Market equilibria under mandatory FP standard, trade and quality signalling   
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 The total Canadian welfare equals the B consumers’ surplus (i.e., area CEfmPfm) plus the 
A consumers’ surplus (i.e., area AEc0Pc0) plus the surplus of domestic FP producers (i.e., area 
PfmEfmI) minus the cost of implementing and managing a label (i.e., C). The cost of the label is 
critical to determining whether this scenario is more favourable than the autarky case. 
Table 1 summarizes the total welfare that is generated in the Canadian pork market in the 
six scenarios that have been analyzed and compares the welfare outcomes in each case to Case 2 
(fully credible voluntary labelling). To recap, these findings were based on several assumptions. 
First, producers have been divided according to the production method used on the farm into two 
groups: CP and FP. Second, it was assumed that the CP producers have lower production costs 
than the FP producers. Third, both groups of producers were assumed to be price takers. Fourth, 
FP producers were assumed to obtain the FP certification at no charge. Fifth, it was assumed that 
FP producers never find it profitable to sell their products on the CP market. Sixth, autarky (i.e., 
Canada functioning as a closed economy) was assumed for the first five cases of the analysis but 
was relaxed in the sixth case. 
Consumers were divided into two groups according to their preferences for pork. A first 
group, A, included consumers who are indifferent between the CP and the FP, while a second 
group B included individuals who prefer FP to CP. First, it was assumed that consumers from 
both groups know the relative cost structure of the CP and the FP. Second, in the first instance 
consumers were hypothesized to have full information on the regulation of FP voluntary 
labelling and the extent to which any CP producers cheat by falsely labelling their products as 
FP. In the second instance, this assumption was relaxed. Third, it was considered that the B 




higher price for the FP than for the CP. Finally, the regulator’s labelling and enforcement costs 
for FP were not present in the analysis except for case 6. 
Based on these assumptions the analysis predicts that a situation of voluntary labelling 
that is relatively credible will maximize the welfare that accrues to all players on the Canadian 
pork market. In addition, this scenario allows heterogeneous consumers to choose between 
different combinations of price and quality according to their preferences. Finally, provided that 
the label is credible, the government does not have to incur the costs associated with perfect 
enforcement of voluntary FP labelling or with implementation and management of an official 
label that signals the animal-friendly attribute of the FP produced domestically under a 
mandatory FP standard. Understanding that factors that enhance or constrain the credibility of a 
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59 Conclusions 
This study aimed to identify the main mechanisms – i.e., legislation, codes of practice 
and labelling – that can address market deficiencies for FAW products, as well as the role of 
different stakeholders – i.e. government, farmer industry groups, retailers and processors, third 
party organizations, and animal rights groups. All of these mechanisms are aimed at providing 
appropriate levels of FAW in the Canadian market place and helping consumers to make 
informed choices about the quality of the food they buy.  
Governments can legislate minimum farm animal welfare standards. Legislation tries to 
reflect government’s assessment of society’s demands for minimum standards of FAW. 
Examples of legislation in Canada are the Health of Animals Regulations (i.e. Part XII defines 
conditions for the humane transportation of all animals in Canada by all modes of transport) and 
the Meat Inspection Regulations (i.e. sets standards for the humane handling and slaughter of 
food animals in federally inspected slaughter facilities). Apart from these two legislative acts, the 
Federal government has not taken any major steps toward setting minimum legislative 
requirements related to farm animal welfare as has been the case in other countries, such as the 
EU (e.g. phasing out gestation stalls or prohibiting the use of sub-therapeutic antibiotics in pork 
production) The lack of more proactive regulatory involvement may simply reflect the absence 
of a strong demand for FAW legislation by Canadians given satisfactory industry FAW 
strategies, or may reflect a latent demand for legislative change among consumers that will 
emerge more gradually. A fruitful area for further research will be to investigate Canadian 
consumer perceptions of the current status of FAW in Canada and the appropriate role for public 
sector regulation and enforcement of FAW standards. 
 
60 Rather than legislative minimum standards, codes of practice (i.e., recommended codes 
of practice for all major farm species developed and released by the AAFC in the 1980s) are 
often a basis for the FAW strategies of livestock and poultry industries in Canada (i.e. the 
Animal Care Assessment implemented by the Canadian Pork Council and the Animal Care 
Program developed by CEMA) and provide information for the other interested stakeholders. In 
parallel, private enterprises – processors, retailers, restaurant chains and third party organizations 
(i.e. the BC SPCA or the WHS) – have their own FAW industry codes of practice which are, in 
general, more stringent than the AAFC/producer groups codes of practice. In the absence of 
public standards and enforcement, the private sector needs to bear responsibility for setting and 
enforcing standards if there is a genuine demand for FAW products from consumers. The 
phasing in by CEMA of higher welfare standards for egg producers (i.e., voluntary adoption of 
increased space per hen in battery cages starting April 1
st, 2008) suggests that there may be an 
ongoing shift in responsibility for FAW from the public to the private sector in Canada. The 
economic analysis presented in section 6.0 predicts that a voluntary standard that is credible 
would yield the highest social welfare. The key element here is credibility: welfare gains 
dissipate in the absence of credibility. As also noted in section 6.0, voluntary standards allow 
heterogeneous consumers to choose between different combinations of price and quality 
according to their preferences. 
Labels are a final mechanism the agri-food industry and governments use to help 
consumers make informed choices. Canada does not currently have a government-sanctioned 
quality label or quality assurance process that would verify assurances to consumers that 
livestock and poultry products have been sourced from animals raised on farms using enhancing 
AW production methods. Is public accreditation of a quality label necessary? This study notes 
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 several incidences of firms who already use labels and third party verification to achieve market 
premiums – e.g., The Aliment Breton Foods in the case of pork production or Burnbrae Farms in 
the case of egg production. Clearly there exists a sub-set of consumers who are willing to pay for 
FAW products. What remains unclear at present is the extent to which other Canadian consumers 
would readily switch to this market given increased availability of FAW products at different 
prices. 
In addition to setting standards, certification and verification of these practices through an 
independent assessment and audit process is also important. Credible standard setting and 
product labelling also require the effective implementation of a supply chain monitoring system 
for FAW oriented products, independent of whether this is imposed voluntarily or through 
statutory requirement. Which type of certification would best deliver credible assurances – i.e., 
whether this has to be government or self-producer or third party certification – should be further 
probed through direct consumer research. The dimensions of trust identified by Frewer et al 
(2005) provide a useful basis for this type of analysis. Specifically, consumers’ confidence in 
these stakeholders depends upon the extent to which they trust different organizations for 
accurate information about the FAW (i.e., welfare of pigs), think that these organizations are 
knowledgeable, think that these organizations are transparent (open) and accountable, and think 
that these organizations act according to consumers’ best interests when providing information 
about the welfare of pigs. Further research explicitly examining the nature of Canadian 
consumers trust in stakeholders on the basis of these criteria is warranted
38.  
 
                                                 
38 Indeed, consumer surveys examining these questions are currently underway. Further information about this 
research is available from the authors upon request. 
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 The welfare analysis presented in section 6.0 suggested that regulatory minimum 
standards for animal welfare (i.e., a ban on the use of gestation stalls or the use of antibiotics) 
will result in a lower level of social welfare if the industry must incur higher production costs to 
comply, and if consumers (only some of have strong preferences regarding FAW) have to pay 
substantially higher prices for food. These conclusions are supported by several empirical studies 
undertaken in other countries with a longer experience than Canada with respect to regulation of 
FAW. For example, Liljenstolpe (2008a) analyzed the economic effects of the “Swedish model” 
in a structural equation model. She found that the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, a ban on using 
growth promoters and increased space requirements for nursing sows, has negatively affected the 
supply of pigs
39. If these AW measures had not been put in place, Liljenstople (2008a) finds that 
total production would have had a steady growth and the retail price of pork would have been 
lower. Furthermore, Tonsor et al (2008) examine US consumer preferences for alternative pork 
production techniques (gestation stalls). The authors investigate the extent of consumer 
preference heterogeneity influencing opinions about gestation stalls, finding no economic 
support for a blanket ban on the use of gestation crates that would impact all consumers. Their 
results suggest that consumer surplus loss is higher in the scenario in which pork is produced 
under a ban on the use of gestation crates versus when pork is labelled as being sourced from 
producers voluntarily selecting not to use gestation crates (see Appendix 10 for a more detailed 
summary).  
There is a need for similar consumer preference research in a Canadian context, 
specifically, identifying the extent to which Canadians comprise the ‘Group A’ and ‘Group B’ 
consumers in section 6.0, and the strength of preferences of each group. If the majority of 
                                                 
39 “The “Swedish Model” refers to the animal welfare promoting regulation and voluntary certification schemes that 
was adopted in Swedish pig production from the 1980s and onwards” (Liljenstolpe, 2008a, abstract).  
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 consumers are indifferent between conventionally produced and ‘animal friendly’ pork, but 
policy is responsive to lobbyist pressure from a sub-set of consumers with strong preferences, 
there is a risk of ‘over-regulating’ the provision of AW. On the other hand, if the more vocal 
consumer minority in fact represent a latent preference for higher AW standards and more 
credible labelling, then the market may be under-providing this quality attribute. Future 
consumer research should account for heterogeneity in preferences among Canadian consumers.  
Other areas for further research include whether Canadian consumers associate 
improvements in farm animal welfare with higher meat prices, and if so, are they willing to 
accept such price increases, taking into account the heterogeneity highlighted above. From a 
policy and an industry marketing perspective it would be instructive to know which alternative 
pork production techniques (i.e., gestation stalls, the use of antibiotics, indoor Vs outdoor 
housing) Canadians perceive as being the most important for delivering higher levels of AW, and 
whether consumer perceptions are consistent with those of scientific experts in animal welfare. 
Moreover, insights into consumers’ valuation of alternative methods of quality verification (i.e. 
by government, by agricultural producers, producer associations, downstream food firms, or a 
third party enterprise) are valuable, as is whether declared trust in the verifying organization 
relates to willingness to pay for these FAW attributes. It is hoped that this study provides a 
comprehensive basis for further analysis of animal welfare quality verification in Canada and the 
appropriate role for both public policy and private standards in delivering credible quality 
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 Appendix 1: Examples of Codes of Practice and Certification – USA 
 
United Egg Producers Certified Program –  
 
Egg Industry Establishes Welfare Guidelines  
 
Recognizing the public interest for animal welfare, United Egg Producers (UEP) called 
for a review of the scientific literature on specific topics relevant to the well-being of egg 
laying hens. 
The effort started in 1999 with the formation of an independent scientific advisory 
committee charged with reviewing all scientific literature on animal well-being for egg-
laying hens, and to recommend further research if necessary. The committee, composed 
of leading animal welfare scientific experts in the U.S. including USDA officials, 
academicians, scientists and humane association members, completed this mission and 
made recommendations to the United Egg Producers and the industry. 
 
From these scientific recommendations, UEP wrote a set of industry guidelines titled 
“Animal Husbandry Guidelines for U.S. Egg Laying Flocks.” These guidelines were first 
introduced as a voluntary program in 2002 for the industry to implement when requested 
by their customers, since then they have evolved into a committed program called 
“United Egg Producers Certified.” 
 
The United Egg Producers Certified program standards are the strictest in the industry 
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 and are part of our ongoing commitment to providing American consumers the safest, 
best quality and most economical eggs in the world. Our farmers commit to these strict 
guidelines and are audited by the USDA and Validus for compliance on 100 percent of 
their farms before they are allowed to place the United Egg Producers Certified seal of 
approval on their egg packaging. 
 
The UEP Certified program for cage production provides assurance that hens receive 
adequate space, nutritious food, clean water, proper lighting, and fresh air daily as well as 
improves the flock’s liveability and egg production rates.  
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal 
Trade Commission have approved the UEP Certified logo and the International Egg 
Commission has recognized the program as a model from which to create animal welfare 
programs in other member countries throughout the world. In addition, the Food 
Marketing Institute and the National Council of Chain Restaurants also endorsed these 
guidelines. 
Source: United Egg Producers (2008), “United Egg Producers Certified Program - Egg Industry 
Establishes Welfare Guidelines”, available at: 
http://www.uepcertified.com/abouttheprogram.html 
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 Appendix 2: Examples of Codes of Practice and Certification ––Canada 
 
The Canadian Egg Marketing Agency - Animal Care Assessment (ACA) 
“Recognizing its leadership role in promoting humane treatment of farm animals, the Agency 
agreed to serve as secretariat for the development of a Recommended Code of Practice for the 
care and handling of pullets, layers and spent fowl. Under the auspices of the Canadian Agri-
Food Research Council, CEMA organized two meetings with representatives of the Canadian 
Federation of Humane Societies, the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency and other credible organizations in the animal care field to reach 
consensus on guidelines for the humane treatment of animals used in the egg laying industry” 
(CEMA 2001, p.28). This action finalized in 2002 with the release of a new code which was 
substantially different from the one of 1989 in that it only addresses guidelines specific to the 
care and handling of birds in the egg sector (CEMA 2002, p.15). In addition to the increase in the 
recommended housing space and the phase out of the controlled moulting, other major 
differences in the guidelines from the 1989 Code to the new one are: 
 
•  There is now a specific recommendation that beak trimming should ideally take place 
prior to 14 days of age. Beak trimming is not recommended after eight weeks of age. 
•  There is a recommendation to provide an electrolyte solution containing vitamins, 
particularly vitamin K.  
•  There are now special sections to address the specific welfare concerns associated with 
free-range and free-run operations. 
•  There is a recommendation to have generators available in the event of electrical failure. 
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 •  There are new building and yard design considerations for transportation. Specific 
suggestions are made for moving birds from one laying operation to another. 
 
“The Code is the most authoritative welfare text on laying operations in Canada. It is science-
based and was developed by consensus among several groups, including welfare advocates. The 
egg industry is demonstrating to egg customers that it is serious when it comes to animal welfare. 
Several provincial boards have worked together to develop measurable welfare criteria, based on 
the recommendations in the Code, for egg farms. CEMA participated in numerous meetings that 
resulted in a preliminary rating system that is to be field tested in 2003” (CEMA 2002 p.15). 
“The Animal Care Program was developed to be credible and realistic, the main tool for 
conveying to producers the major guidelines found in the Code. Farms are inspected against 14 
criteria pertaining to density, water and feed, beak trimming, house temperature, lighting, air 
quality, moulting, generators and layer condition” (CEMA 2004, p.25). 
“While it is obvious to egg farmers that welfare is a critical consideration in laying 
operations, this is not as clear to some egg users who have considered putting welfare criteria in 
their purchasing specifications. By developing a rating system based on the Code, the industry 
will have consistent, generally accepted practices based on what is good for layers, rather than 
what may allow one or another company to temporarily secure a greater share of the market” 
(CEMA 2002, p.15). 
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 Appendix 3: The Canadian Pork Council - Animal Care Assessment (ACA)  
 
The objectives of this program would be to: 
•  Promote sound animal care practices on 
Canadian hog farms; 
•  Provide a mechanism to demonstrate 
that these practices are being followed; 
•  Build confidence throughout the supply 
chain and consumers. 
 
The program itself must: 
•  Have set minimum requirements; 
•  Be repeatable, valid and reliable; 
•  Use measurable tools (minimize 
subjectivity); 
•  Be educational and enhance awareness; 
•  Have a validation tool that moves 
beyond education; 
•  Be a blend of both evaluation of the pig 
and the process; 
•  Be clear, cost effective, simple and 
transparent; 
•  Build on the existing food safety 
program, CQA, to prevent duplication. 
 
The materials that had been developed by the working group were reviewed by the 
Canadian Meat Council, the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies, the Canadian Veterinary 
Medical Association and the Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors in 2004. These 
stakeholders supported the implementation of the ACA tool based upon this review. In 2005, this 
voluntary program was launched as an advance version to raise awareness and generate interest. 
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 The materials are currently available in hard-copy through CQA provincial delivery agents and 
on the web site (www.cqa-aqc.com). 
 
ACA Requirements – The ACA includes mandatory questions in the following areas: 
•  To have copies of or access to the 
recommended codes of practice; 
•  Non-slip flooring on loading ramps and 
in walkways; 
•  Pathways and ramps must be free of 
sharp edges that might cause scratches 
or injury; 
•  A documented standard operating 
procedure for the identification, care 
and humane; 
•  Treatment of sick or injured pigs; 
•  Space where animals needing special 
attention can be isolated and treated; 
•  A euthanasia plan for animals in 
different production stages; 
•  Emergency plans to deal with power 
failures; 
•  Pigs must have access to water; 
•  Pigs must be fed daily to meet their 
requirements; 
•  Equipment that may cause scratches or 
wounds must be promptly repaired or 
replaced; 
•  Minimum space requirements; 
•  Standard operating procedure for 




As well, the assessment tool includes a number of non-required questions including the 
training and assessment of stockpersons, angle of loading ramps, pig handling and devices used 
for moving pigs, air quality, transportation and body condition scoring. 
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Implementation of ACA: The delivery of the ACA tool will build upon the existing CQA 
infrastructure. The program will be delivered by the CQA delivery agency in each province, 
producers will be required to be on the CQA program in order to join ACA. Individuals must be 
trained CQA validators in order to become an ACA validator. 
“The ACA tool is currently available to producers on a voluntary basis. To our 
knowledge, there are no conditions of sale requiring participation in or recognition of the ACA 
program. Our focus at this time is to promote the implementation of the program. Our customers 
are looking for animal care assurances. During these early days of implementation of the ACA 
tool, the evaluation of program implementation will continue to ensure that the tool is a useful 
one for producers to use to demonstrate their on-farm animal care practices”. 
Sources: Lawrence, D (2007); CPC 2005a 
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 Appendix 4 Example of Animal Welfare Policies of A Major Restaurant Chain  
 
McDonald's - Animal Welfare Guiding Principles  
 
1. Safety: First and foremost, McDonald's will provide its customers with safe food 
products. Food safety is McDonald's number one priority. 
Food safety at McDonald's Canada is central to company operations and supply chain 
management. To this end, food safety is integrated into all facets of our business from 
raw material production to our customer service operations.  
 
2. Quality: McDonald's believes treating animals with care and respect is an integral 
part of an overall quality systems program that makes good business sense. 
Quality is a cornerstone at McDonald's. Quality defines our process "From Farm to 
Customer", with animal welfare a critical component of our quality strategy.  
 
3. Animal Treatment: At McDonald's Canada, we support that animals should be free 
from cruelty, abuse and neglect while embracing the proper treatment of animals and 
addressing animal welfare issues. 
McDonald's believes in the ethical treatment of animals, and that animals should be 




 4. Partnership: McDonald's works continuously with our suppliers to audit animal 
welfare practices, ensuring ongoing compliance and continuous improvement. 
Outside experts have helped McDonald's develop systems to measure the effectiveness of 
our animal welfare practices. To that end, McDonald's is committed to implementing an 
auditing system with our suppliers that ensures animal welfare compliance and sharing 
"Best Practices" for continuous improvement. We also encourage all our suppliers to 
conduct self-audits with independent third party bodies on an ongoing basis.  
 
5. Leadership: McDonald's leads our industry, working with our suppliers and industry 
experts to advance animal welfare practices and technology. 
We will continually educate ourselves and our suppliers relative to animal welfare issues, 
ensuring that our programs are based on the best science available. This will include 
working with industry experts and scientists to develop training programs and material 
that will be used to ensure continuous improvements in the area of animal welfare.  
 
6. Performance Measurement: McDonald's sets annual performance objectives to 
measure our improvement and will ensure our purchasing strategy is aligned with our 
commitment to animal welfare issues. 
We will continue to dedicate resources to monitor and coordinate activities associated 
with improving animal welfare, and will incorporate animal welfare objectives into our 
annual business strategy. McDonald's recognizes our responsibility as a major purchaser 
of animal products and the need to establish animal welfare standards and measurements 
ensuring alignment with our purchasing strategy.  
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7. Communication: McDonald's will communicate our process, programs, plans and 
progress surrounding animal welfare. 
McDonald's is committed to sharing our progress with our customers and shareholders, 
while sharing best practices with our competitors. 
  
Source: McDonald's Canada Inc (2008), “Animal Welfare Guiding Principles”, available at: 
http://www.mcdonalds.ca/en/community/animal_principles.aspx 
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 Appendix 5: Example of Animal Welfare Policies of A Major Meat Processor 
 
 
Maple Leaf Inc. - Animal Welfare Statement  
As a leading food processor, Maple Leaf Foods is responsible for ensuring the safe and 
humane treatment of all animals within our care.  
A healthy respect for the well-being, proper handling and humane slaughter of all animals 
within our care is a social and ethical responsibility that maintains an important balance 
between respecting the needs of animals and providing consumers with high quality, 
wholesome and affordable food. This responsibility is shared between Maple Leaf Foods 
and our suppliers, as we all depend on these animals for our products and our livelihood. 
Everyone involved in the raising and processing of animals and poultry, from producers 
and transport workers to all of our employees, are required to adhere to good animal 
handling practices in accordance with industry guidelines, serving as stewards of the 
animals entrusted to their care.  
Maple Leaf retains humane handling experts to inspect our hog and poultry primary 
processing facilities on an ongoing basis. All our meat processing operations are federally 
inspected by on-site inspectors and veterinarians employed by the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency, who continuously review and audit our animal handling practices.  
Maple Leaf Foods and its operating companies support this commitment by:  
•  Adhering to policies and procedures across all our primary processing facilities 
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 and growing operations that assure the respectful and humane treatment of 
animals in accordance with industry codes of practice for animal well-being.  
•  Providing our employees with the knowledge and skills required to ensure proper 
animal handling and welfare practices in their related work areas to ensure they 
perform their jobs in accordance with best practices.  
•  Enforcing a ZERO tolerance for employee abuse of animals within our care and 
taking appropriate disciplinary action including termination of employment when 
these standards are violated.  
•  Routinely auditing our primary processing plants to test the effectiveness of our 
animal welfare practices and procedures based on established and quantifiable 
animal well-being guidelines.  
•  Working with producers who share our commitment to upholding high standards 
of animal welfare.  
•  Contracting only with specialty agricultural transportation companies that provide 
safe and comfortable transportation of livestock and poultry in accordance with 
industry codes of practice.  
•  Taking appropriate disciplinary action against any producers or third party 
suppliers who violate animal welfare practices, which may include the 
termination of contracts.  
•  Regularly consult with leading industry experts and animal psychologists on 
welfare and handling practices.  
Continuously improving our animal welfare practices and supporting the development of 
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 new industry standards and codes through active participation on advisory councils, 
including a leadership role in the National Farm Animal Care Council and support for 
ongoing research.  
Source: Maple Leaf Inc (2008), “Animal Welfare Statement”, available at: 
http://www.mapleleaf.com/AboutUs/AnimalWelfareStatement.aspx 
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 Appendix 6: Example of Animal Welfare Policies of A Major Food Retailer 
 
Safeway Inc. - Animal Welfare Policy 
 
Introduction 
Safeway is a retail grocery industry leader in animal welfare. The company understands 
that its responsibility as a purchaser of food products must include working with its 
vendors to ensure that animals in the food production system are being treated humanely. 
The company has developed a comprehensive animal welfare program to ensure that both 
its national brand and private label suppliers have programs in place standard for the 
humane treatment of animals in all aspects of animal husbandry, shipment, and handling 
during the harvest process. 
 
Scope: All Safeway meat, pork, poultry, egg, dairy and seafood suppliers are required to 
meet a set of designated animal treatment guidelines. In addition to national brands, all 
suppliers of Safeway branded products will be required to meet the same standards. 
Secondary Safeway-branded processors must demonstrate that they require their raw 
material suppliers to meet Safeway’s animal welfare standards. Compliance with the 
Safeway brand produce guidelines will be the responsibility of the Meat Quality 





Safeway’s overall commitment to animal welfare includes an audit program conducted 
by a rotating team of internal and independent auditors. The company has established a 
set of procedures and standards designed to ensure humane treatment of animals. Audits 
are conducted and scheduled under the guidance of Virginia Littlefield, Safeway’s 
Manager, Meat Laboratory and Animal Welfare. Ms. Littlefield is a member of the 
company’s Animal Welfare Advisory Council. 
Audit results are reviewed by Safeway’s Animal Welfare Council and with vendors. 
The third party audit firms approved for inspections are: 
• Silliker Labs 
• Food Safety Net Services 
• NSF-Cook & Thurber 
• Process Management Consulting 
 
Safeway’s Animal Welfare Advisory Council 
Since 2001 Safeway has maintained a professional association with a number of well-
recognized experts in animal welfare. The company recently decided to establish a more 
formal and fully functioning Animal Welfare Council composed of both company and 
independent animal welfare members. The Council’s broad mandate is to provide 
guidance and counsel to the company on matters relating to the humane treatment of 
animals in the food production system. The members of the advisory council are: 
Temple Grandin, Ph.D  (Dr. Grandin is an Associate Professor of Animal Science at 
Colorado State University), Sara Shields, Ph.D (Dr. Shields is an animal welfare 
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 scientist at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, where she teaches in the Animal Science 
department), Janice Swanson, Ph.D. (In April 1992, Dr. Swanson joined the faculty in 
the Department of Animal Sciences and Industry at Kansas State University. In 2002, Dr. 
Swanson achieved the rank of full professor and has been serving as the interim 
department head since January 2005. She is a member of the KSU graduate school 
faculty.), Jim Sheeran, Vice President, Corporate Meat Merchandising, Safeway Inc. 
Virginia Littlefield, Manager, Meat Laboratory/Animal Welfare, Safeway Inc. Brian 
Dowling, Vice President, Public Affairs. Safeway Inc.  
 
Our Commitment 
Safeway remains committed to ensuring that its suppliers are engaged in a process of 
continuous animal welfare improvement. We will work collaboratively with our vendors 
and the animal science community toward further ensuring that the company’s national 
brand and private label brands are sourced from suppliers who meet this standard. 
Source: Safeway Inc (2008), “Animal Welfare Policy”, available at: 
http://shop.safeway.com/corporate/safeway/animal_welfare.asp 
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 Appendix7: Example of the Internet as a source of information for consumers - Aliments 
Foods DuBreton Canada 
 
Our Hog Farming Programs 
 
Our hog farming standards correspond to the needs of our clientele and are clearly 












 Source: Aliments Breton Foods Canada (2008), “Farming and Processing - Our Hog Faming 




















Organic feed, GMO free   X   -   -   -   - 
Outdoor access for animals   X   -   -   -   - 
Loose sow housing   X   X   -   -   - 
Controlled animal welfare 
(farms, transportation, and 
processing plant) 
 X   X   X   -   - 
Rendered animal by-
products in feed 
Never ever  Never ever  Never ever    X   X 
Subtherapeutic antibiotics  Never ever  Never ever  Never ever    X   X 
Therapeutic antibiotics  Never ever  Never ever  Never ever    X   X 
Monitoring for antibiotic 
residues 
 X   X   X   -   - 
Third party certification   X   X   X   -   - 
Minimal processing   X   X   X   X  Yes and no  
No preservatives   X   X   X   X  Yes and no 
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 Appendix.8 Example of AW Certification Program offered by a Third party  
 
British Columbia Society for Protection 
of Cruelty to Animals 
 
Certified Adherence to BC SPCA Farm 
Animal Welfare Standards  
The Winnipeg Humane Society 
 
 
Certified Adherence to WHS Farm 
Animal Welfare Standards   
 
The SPCA Certified program is an 
independent third party certification 
system. It is a certified assurance to 
consumers that food products bearing the 
program label comply with the farm animal 




A first for Canada, meat and eggs 
certified by The Winnipeg Humane 




Participating farms pay for their 
certification, and this provides a guarantee 
The new label marks the first time 
Canadian consumers will be able to 
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 that they have met the BC SPCA's 
standards for the raising and handling of 
farm animals. The BC SPCA standards 
differ from the national code of practices 
published by the Canadian Agri-Food 
Research Council in farm animal 
husbandry practices, including space per 
animal and transportation times.  
SPCA Certified program goals:  
The goals of the SPCA Certified Program 
are:  
- Facilitate and support changes to farm 
animal welfare standards; 
- Provide voluntary third party certification 
services to those involved in the animal 
agricultural industry; 
- Support scientific research and 
development in farm animal welfare.  
 
choose meat from animals raised 
according to standards approved by 
an animal-welfare organization. 
Our standards include: no animal 
caging; minimum space 
requirements; no hormones or 
unnecessary antibiotics; and 
mandatory barn inspections by 
independent professionals. 
The label represents an exciting new 
partnership between Manitoba 
farmers and The Winnipeg Humane 
Society. "It's the right thing to do 
because it works for me and it 
works for the animals," says Bruce 
Daum, a hog farmer near Brandon, 
Manitoba who raises humane-
certified pork. "The partnership lets 
consumers choose humane-labelled 






British Columbia Society for Protection of Cruelty to Animals (2008), “Certified Adherence to 
BC SPCA Farm Animal Welfare Standards, available at: http://www.spca.bc.ca/farm/default.asp 




 Appendix 9: Example of Point of Sale Material used by a private firm to advertise AW features 
and the certification program for livestock and poultry products. 
 
Source : Aliments Breton Foods Canada 
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 Appendix 10: Summary of additional consumer research on perceptions of Farm Animal 
Welfare 
 
Studies with empirical evidence that consumers assess FP as having a superior taste 
relative to CP 
The assumption made in Section 6.0 that some consumers may perceive FP as being of 
higher quality than the CP is based on the results of a number of consumer surveys. Studies in 
various countries have concluded that consumers perceive products incorporating animal-
friendly attributes as being of higher quality than those produced using conventional methods. 
For instance, in Ireland focus group discussions revealed that “free range” eggs and “free range” 
chickens were perceived to taste better than their conventional counterparts (Cowan et al., 1998). 
Moreover, the majority of the Irish consumers surveyed (i.e., 77%) regard "free range" as a 
positive indicator of food safety. Similarly, Miele and Parisi (1998) found that 73% of the 
customers surveyed at an Italian supermarket offering “free range” eggs thought that these eggs 
are better than the conventional ones; 47% considered them better with respect to quality, while 
21% did so with respect to freshness.  
In an Australian study, Rolfe (1999) found that consumers were willing to pay a premium 
for “free range” eggs. Additionally, he found that forty percent of the respondents consume “free 
range” eggs because they believe these eggs are more natural and healthier than regular eggs.  
In the United Kingdom, Harper and Makatouni (2002) investigate consumers’ attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to two food trends - organic food and animal welfare. The authors find 
that consumers perceive products incorporating animal-friendly attributes as superior in the 
94 
 health benefits they provide relative to conventional products. In a study eliciting the opinion of 
Swiss consumers on the superiority of meat (i.e., sausages) with animal-friendly attributes, 
Badertscher (1997) found a strong agreement – i.e., 73% of consumers agreed with the statement 
that meat coming from animal-friendly production systems is of higher quality
40. 
Norwood et al. (2007) also examined at how US consumers see the relationship between animal 
welfare and meat quality. In particular, they wanted to see if consumers perceive whether farms 
with higher standards of animal care will also produce safer meat. That is, people may indicate 
that they are concerned about animal welfare, not for the sake of the animal per se, but because 
they like better tasting, safer meat and perceive that farms with higher standards of animal care 
are more likely to produce meat with these qualities. This appears to have been the case as 53% 
of respondents strongly agreed and 25% agreed with the statement “animals raised under higher 
standards of care will produce safer and better tasting meat.”    
Ophuis (1994) conducted sensory evaluation tests of “free range” and “regular” pork in 
the Netherlands. He concludes that consumers perceive pork identified as incorporating the “free 
range" attribute as having a better taste than “regular” pork. For example, the biggest differences 
between “free range” and “regular” pork occurred in the group of consumers that had prior 
experience with “free range” pork and participated in sensory tests under labelled conditions. 
This category of consumers assessed “free range” pork in comparison to “regular” pork as 
significantly more juicy, less bland and tough, more savoury and tender, less fat and dry, and 
more pleasant. 
 
                                                 
40 Statement: Products from animal-friendly production systems are of higher quality. N = 645. Scale with seven 
levels: 1 = I do not agree at all, 7 = I agree completely.  Rejection = levels 1–3; neutral = level 4; agreement = levels 
5–7. Source: Phan-Huy, A. S. and F. R. Badertscher Fawaz (2003) after Badertscher (1997), p. 123.  
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   Finally, Armah and Kennedy (2000) elicited the preference of consumers living in 
Arkansas for pasture-raised pork. They found that 65% of those consumers would prefer pasture-
raised pork over conventional-produced pork. More specifically, 67% of the respondents 
considered pasture-raised pork leaner than conventional-produced pork, while 62% of them 
believed it to be healthier.  
 
Studies with empirical evidence of consumers’ willingness to pay a price premium for FP 
relative to CP 
The assumption in Section 6.0 that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for FP 
pork compared to CP pork is based on the results of a number of consumer surveys in various 
countries that showed a clear willingness to pay for FP. These are summarized below. 
In Canada, Goddard et al (2007) evaluated the interest of consumers from Alberta and 
Ontario in different types of eggs, including Omega-3, organic, free run/range, vitamin enhanced 
and vegetarian. They made use of stated preference data from two surveys undertaken in two 
consecutive years (i.e., 2005 and 2006) and revealed preference data from an AC Nielson 
Homescan@ panel data set. Results suggested that consumers in Alberta are not willing to pay 
more for specialty eggs, and in fact had a negative willingness to pay (i.e., at the mean of all 
variables) of $-1.76/per egg for free-range eggs relative to normal eggs in the frequency model 
(i.e. how often across a three year period households purchased each type of egg) and a positive 
but small WTP of $0.23/ per egg for free-range eggs relative to normal eggs in the choice model. 
By contrast, consumers in Ontario showed a significant WTP for free-range eggs in both models, 
namely:  $0.99/ per egg for free-range eggs relative to normal eggs in the frequency model and 
$1.63/ per egg for free-range eggs relative to normal eggs in the choice model.  
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In Sweden, Carlson et al (2004) employed stated preferences (i.e., a choice experiment) 
to obtain consumers’ preferences and WTP for quality attributes (i.e. animal welfare) of food 
products (i.e., chicken, beef, pork, eggs). They found that consumers were willing to pay a 67% 
premium for pork sourced from pigs raised outdoors over pork sourced from pigs raised indoors. 
As well, consumers were willing to pay an 8% premium for pork sourced from pigs slaughtered 
in mobile abattoirs over pork sourced from pigs slaughtered in a slaughter house (Carlson et al, 
2004). Similarly, Liljenstople (2008b) investigated the demand for AW attributes among a 
sample of Swedish consumers when buying pork. She found a 32 % premium for pork sourced 
from pigs raised outdoors and a 19% premium for pork sourced from pigs slaughtered in mobile 
abattoirs.  
Lusk et al (2006) estimated the WTP of US consumers for pork produced without 
subtherapeutic antibiotics. The authors conducted valuation experiments near the meat counter of 
a grocery store in Oklahoma. Results of the experiment suggested that consumers place 
substantial price premiums on pork produced without antibiotics (i.e. authors found a 76% 
premium for pork raised without antibiotics over pork raised with antibiotics). 
Nilsson et al (2006) also characterized the demand and the market potential of a credence 
certification program for fresh pork cuts in the US. They derived consumers’ WTP for 
conventional pork and pork certified for environment, animal welfare and antibiotic use. The 
authors found that WTP for AW certification varied from 7.5 % to 52% premium, and that WTP 
for the no antibiotic use certification varied from 5.6% to 72% premium for the category of price 
conscious and the category of concerned shoppers respectively. 
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Tonsor et al (2008) conducted a survey on a sample of 205 consumers in Michigan. They 
used stated preferences (i.e. choice experiments) aiming to: “1) estimate consumer WTP for 
alternative pork production practice attributes including use of gestation crates; 2) examine if 
these preferences are related to preferences for farm size and country-of-origin attributes; 3) 
evaluate if banning use of gestation crates may be justified on grounds of economic welfare 
enhancement; and 4) identify the distribution of welfare impacts of gestation crate bans across 
consumers” (Tonsor et al., 2008). Regression analysis was used to determine whether consumers 
were willing to pay more for pork labelled as being sourced from producers voluntarily selecting 
not to use gestation crates or as being produced under a gestation crate ban.  
The authors found significant WTP estimates for pork produced without the use of 
gestation stalls. In a homogeneous consumers model, the representative consumers have a 
significant preference for pork from operations that voluntarily choose to not use gestation crates 
(mean WTP of $1.13/lb) and a negative preference (mean WTP of -$0.32) for pork produced 
under a gestation crate ban relative to typical pork chops. Tonsor et al (2008) reject the 
hypothesis that a ban on gestation crates would improve consumer welfare.  
The authors capture consumer heterogeneity by dividing the sample into four different 
groups according their attitudes: “Pork Enjoyers” (32% of the sample population), “Attribute 
Conscious”  (32%),  “Price Conscious” (14%), and “Ban Preferring” (32% of the sample 
population) (Tonsor et al, 2008). They find that the first two groups (combined approximately 
two-thirds of the sample) placed a significant premium on pork from producers voluntarily 




only a subset (approximately 20%) of the total sample have pork preferences that could justify a 
ban on gestation crates.  